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Abstract
Unequal quality of fundamental institutions induces different patterns of interna-
tional capital flows in terms of both direction and magnitude. This dissertation ex-
amines, theoretically and empirically, the link between the financial intermediation
sector and capital flows by highlighting the role of institutions and the technological
level that financial intermediaries have access to. The theoretical section employs
a model with endogenous labour input in monitoring loans by the financial inter-
mediary. Numerical exercises reveal that this modification improves the traditional
exogenous model by replicating the stylized facts, in particular, the model is able to
replicate and explain the non-monotonic relationship between institutional quality
and international net bank flows. Furthermore, contrary to the exogenous model,
the model with endogenous labour input is able to reproduce a loan interest rate
profile which decreases as institutional quality improves. The empirical section uses
a panel of 56 rich and middle-income countries and cross-border bank flows and
reveals that, firstly, institutional quality matters slightly more for the mid-income
countries in explaining the net bank flows, while for high-income countries it is the
market fundamentals which are significant explanatory forces. Secondly, while for
both income groups the rule of law and voice & accountability indices are significant,
for mid-income countries government effectiveness is also of significance.
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Chapter One: Introduction
International capital flows come in forms of debt, portfolio investments or foreign di-
rect investments. Debt flows are generally volatile and short-term compared to some
other types of flows such as foreign direct investments. Determinants of debt flows,
and in particular bank flows, have not been studied in depth within the literature
despite being comparable in size to flows of foreign direct investments. As with any
type of capital flow, it is important to understand the forces behind the direction and
magnitude of flows across borders. The study may yield an understanding of differ-
ences in economic foundations of countries while at the same time shedding light on
the mechanisms through which the flows can be managed from a policy perspective.
Fundamental institutions are the economic and political constraints that shape
economic interaction. Unequal quality of fundamental institutions induce differ-
ent patterns of international bank flows in terms of both direction and magnitude.
Throughout this dissertation, references to institutional measures are references to
the perceptions of how well-functioning these institutions are (in practice or de facto)
as opposed to de jure. This is an important distinction since as what is in the regu-
latory framework or the constitution is not the same as what happens in practice.
Bank flows, despite being generally short-term in nature, like all other types of
flows are driven by deep institutional fundamentals such as the degree of corruption,
quality of regulations, and political stability to name a few. Therefore, understanding
the long-term and deep drivers of flows of bank loans can help with prediction,
prevention and response to reversals and sudden stops which are often harmful to
economies with fragile financial markets. Good functioning general institutions are
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the foundations of any well-functioning economy. Contract enforcements for example
are shown to spur innovation, while quality of the regulatory framework impacts the
level of competitiveness of an economy.
A study of cross-border movement of bank loans, as a major component of debt
flows, is tantamount to examining the functioning of the financial intermediation
sector and the quality of the general institutions governing the economy. In partic-
ular, the financial intermediaries engage in credit creation by raising funds through
deposits and issuing loans to entrepreneurs. Monitoring and consolidating loans in
light of information asymmetry are costly to the financial intermediary and the costs
may be exacerbated due to poor general institutions supporting the financial in-
termediation sector. Some of such institutional qualities of interest are governance
quality, political stability, quality of the regulatory framework, strength of the rule
of law, and the ability to control corruption.
This dissertation aims to explore the link between institutional quality and capital
flows both theoretically and empirically. The theoretical study presented in Chapter
2 extends the costly-state verification model of Williamson (1986) by allowing for en-
dogenous labour input into the monitoring technology within a small open economy
setting. The resulting model better reproduces the stylized facts: the non-monotonic
relationship between bank outflows and institutional quality measures and the reduc-
tion in the interest rate spread caused by improvements in the quality of institutions.
The introduction of labour input into the monitoring technology allows the financial
intermediaries to better manage the cost of intermediation. Due to the decreasing
returns to scale in the production process of the risky projects, when the increase
2
in the number of risky projects being funded (adjustment in the extensive margin)
dominates the decrease in the loan size per project (adjustment in the intensive mar-
gin), the economy experiences a greater distributional efficiency. Bank loans then
flow out more for countries with good institutions and less for countries with poor
institutions. Without the modifications in the model, bank loans would be flowing
out more for countries with poor institutions which is contrary to what the data
shows.
In the theoretical study I take one parameter to represent all forms of institutional
quality as an aggregate. A natural extension would be to try and discover empirically
which institutions matter specifically; the magnitude and direction of the association
between types of institutions and bank flows. The empirical approach relies on
a panel data constituted of International Monetary Funds International Financial
Statistics bank flow data and the World Bank’s governance indicator data to establish
the nexus between institutional quality and bank flows. The theoretical model in
Chapter 2 studies the net outflow of capital as it measures the difference between
domestic deposits and domestic loans, where the excess funds will be lent abroad.
The institutional variables may include measures such as governance quality,
degree of control of corruption, enforcement of the rule of law, political stability,
citizen participation and government accountability, and finally, policy quality and
government credibility. No institutional quality measure is perfect and measurement
issues would exacerbate when one focuses on de facto measures as opposed to de jure.
As such, Chapter 3 uses the World Bank governance indicators which are intended
to capture the “perceptions” of institutional qualities as opposed to the de factor
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qualities.
Two key features in the theoretical model separate this work from existing work
in the literature. First, labour input is endogenized in the monitoring technology,
allowing the financial intermediary to choose not only the optimum level of moni-
toring but also the unit monitoring costs in response to changes in the underlying
parameters of the model. Second, as the project size is determined endogenously,
the intermediary rations credit on the intensive margin and all entrepreneurs qualify
for a loan but may not receive the loan size they desire.
The closest work to this research is Greenwood et al. (2010)’s attempt to link
financial intermediation with economic development and total factor productivity
gains. Greenwood et al. (2010) endogenize the labour input into the monitoring
technology within an imperfect information framework and not in a costly state veri-
fication setting. As a result, the more the intermediary spends on intermediation the
higher the probability of success in monitoring and so the authors can draw a link to
higher economic development and higher spending on intermediation. Furthermore,
the loan size is determinate in their model and the environment is a closed-economy
setting. My model however focuses on how the presence of information asymme-
try is dealt with, given the possible variations in institutional quality and banking
technologies, and what the net effect is on cross-border flows of bank loans.
Capital flows in general may depend on the stage of development and GDP growth
rates as Aharonovitz and Miller (2010) explain. Higher output is associated with
financial outflows in later stages of development since “the local savings are increasing
by more than the local demand for capital”. Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian (2006)
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also show that among the poor countries, capital tends to flow more to low-growth
economies. Less developed economies tend to suffer from poor regulations, high level
of corruption, dysfunctional governments and political risks.
Imrohoroglu and Kumar (2003) study intermediation and physical capital flows
in a model in which entrepreneurs can choose between a safe and a risky project.
They modify a neoclassical model to include intermediation costs and show that
an opposing income effect (from higher total intermediation costs) and substitution
effect (from substituting capital into safe projects) result in returns to capital ex-
hibiting non-monotonicity and thus generating significant variations in returns across
countries. However, they take monitoring intensity to be fully exogenous unlike this
paper. Furthermore, with the focus of their paper being on flows of physical capital,
there is little lessons which can be drawn in terms of capital account liberalization
and determinants of short-term capital flows.
Alessandria and Qian (2005) also study financial intermediation and capital ac-
count liberalization. They show that efficiency of the intermediary sector is not a nec-
essary nor a sufficient condition for a successful capital account liberalization. Con-
versely, liberalization has an ambiguous effect on financial sector efficiency and may
either improve or worsen it. Their paper however differs in project types and mon-
itoring set-up with the intermediary committing resources to monitoring ex ante1.
While they look at the impacts of liberalization on the financial sector efficiency, we
look at the impact of institutions on the efficiency of the financial sector and thus
1In Stiglitz and Weiss (1992) entrepreneurs have same choices as in this paper however they are
assumed to be risk-averse and monitoring cost is exogenous. In Diamond (1984) and Williamson
(1986) monitoring costs are exogenous as well.
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the capital flows.
The empirical study in Chapter 3 examines the net inflow of bank loans by taking
the difference between the inflows of bank loans and outflows of banks loans in the
data. The Feasible Generalized Linear regression estimation of the random effects
model reveals that depending on income, different institutions matter differently
when it comes to bank flows.
As with the theoretical literature, the empirical literature on this subject is thin.
Papaioannou (2004) emphasizes the importance of directly modelling institutional
quality effects. Using a sample of 55 recipient countries between 1984 and 2002, the
author shows that well-functioning institutions are the single most important driving
force for international capital flows: a 5% decline in political risk in the recipient
country is associated with a 2% increase in bilateral bank flows. Likewise, Papaioan-
nou (2009) use bank flows from 19 source to 49 recipient countries and find that GDP
per capita is a significant correlate. In other words, bank flows are attracted to richer
economies. At the same time, institutional quality is a more significant correlate for
bank flows than both income and human capital. Unfortunately, the model lacks
any interaction or quadratic terms and fails to capture any possible non-linearities.
In another somewhat related work, Chinn and Ito (2006) use a panel of 108
countries to study the effect of capital account liberalization on equity markets.
They further underline the importance of institutional quality by concluding that
financial systems with a higher degree of legal/institutional development on average
benefit more from financial liberalization. Similarly, Alfaro, Ozcan and Volosovych
(2005) use a sample of 81 countries and find low institutional quality to be the leading
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explanation for the Lucas Paradox. Finally, as famously documented by La Porta et
al. (1997), countries with poor institutions and a French civil law system suffer from
“smaller and narrower” capital markets. Hence, it is of interest to study theoretically
the links between institutional quality, income level, and international capital flows.
The finding will help rationalize the empirical findings in the literature.
While financial flows can be growth enhancing and welfare augmenting (Bailliu,
2000; Hagen and Zhang, 2011), they may also be vehicles for crisis transmission
when general institutions are weak (Faria and Mauro, 2009; Herrmann and Mihaljek,
2010). Bank loans have been shown to be just as reversible as portfolio investments
(Sula and Willett, 2009) and, given the high exposure of banks to emerging markets,
the understanding of the underlying determinants and fundamentals is essential for
better macro policy design and better decision making by the agents in the banking
sector. From a theoretical point of view, this linkage of institutional quality with
bank flows has generally received less attention in comparison to other types of
capital such as foreign direct investments and portfolio investments. Ju and Wei
(2010, 2011) show that financial capital generally flows from countries with low
quality of institutions to countries with high quality of institutions. Furthermore,
the inefficiency of the financial market results in an inflow of foreign direct investment
and an outflow of financial capital (the so-called Bypass Effect). Mutsuyama (2008)
similarly demonstrates that in the presence of financial market insecurity, mirrored by
poor contract enforcements, capital flows out of poor countries to finance investments
in richer countries. In addition, von Hagen and Zhang (2011) show that under free
mobility of FDI and financial capital, flows are welfare improving. This relationship
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is best understood when the financial sector of a country is viewed as an endowment.
Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2009) introduce financial friction to a neo-
classical model and report that capital flows from poor to rich countries mostly in
form of investments in less risky and less profitable assets. This is because higher
growth rate of developing economies results in lower domestic savings, while at the
same time “lower development of financial markets” in these countries induce higher
savings. The authors claim that the heterogeneity in financial market development
between the poor and rich countries is the primary reason behind some of the puzzles
in capital mobility patterns. Finally, Pol Antras and Ricardo Caballero (2009) extend
a Heckscher-Ohlin-Mundell model to a dynamic setting by allowing for heterogeneity
in the financial sector across countries. In summary, they find that capital flows to
countries with underdeveloped financial markets. The theoretical predictions are
equivocal at best and often depend on the deep institutional parameters. In all these
aforementioned studies, financial intermediaries are taken to be a single exogenous
force and are not differentiated. For example, while poor contractual enforcement
is reminiscent of the strength of rule of law, one would expect that poor regulatory
quality and lack of political stability make investment opportunities less appealing to
investors.
The first interesting finding of the empirical chapter is that, ignoring income
levels, political stability tends to be the most significant type of institutional quality
affecting bank flows. However, when income levels are taken into account, rule of
law and voice & accountability matter for rich countries, and political stability is no
longer significant. Furthermore, for mid-income countries, government effectiveness,
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rule of law, and voice & accountability matter most, though not the same as they
would for rich economies. For example, while bank inflows are increasing in quality
of rule of law for mid-income countries, they are decreasing in quality of rule of law
for richer countries.
Rule of law in particular measure the perception of of the extend to which agents
have confidence in and abide by the rules of the society. These rules include quality
of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the
likelihood of crime and violence. It may well be that the returns to improvements
in rule of law are yet to be fully exhausted for mid-income countries and hence their
tendency to absorb bank flows. Furthermore, while flows to richer countries may
be in search of risk diversification, the flows to mid-income countries may be the
outcome of return differentials and mostly profit-seeking. More detailed analysis and
scrutiny may be needed to systematically explain the underlying reasons.
There are measurement issues with such institutional indices in the sense that
there is an element of objectivity in how these measures are constructed. Further-
more, focusing on perceptions as opposed to actual institutional quality as measured
by provisions in the law or regulatory framework may also have implications for
policy implementation.
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the
theoretical model along with numerical simulations. Chapter 3 reports the results
of the empirical investigation by describing the data and the modelling approach
followed by exploration of the results and robustness analysis. The conclusion is
presented in Chapter 4.
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Chapter Two: Financial Intermediation and Capi-
tal Mobility
1 Introduction
Financial intermediaries are significant players in allocating investment funds within
and across countries. Past attempts to understand the forces behind international
capital movements have largely ignored the role of the financial intermediation sector.
These financial intermediaries operate within carefully regulated environments and
their operational efficiency heavily depends on the technological improvements in the
financial sector as well as the quality of the general institutions (such as the strength
of rule of law or control of corruption). Short-term flows such as cross-border flow of
bank loans are generally the first stage of the capital account liberalization sequence
(Bayoumi and Ohnsorge, 2013), and as such, understanding the forces behind such
flows is necessary to ensure a smooth and successful liberalization process. Identifying
these factors may help in controlling and avoiding sudden reversals, minimizing the
potential harms, and ensuring that the flows are beneficial to the domestic economy.
Another less obvious benefit of such study has to do with understanding the lack of
capital flows from rich to poor and mid-income countries as pointed out by Lucas
(1990). In particular, in the data we observe that after accounting for the quality
of institutions, bank loans tend to flow to the mid-income countries and out of the
rich and poor economies. As such, by modelling the financial intermediary sector
more meticulously we will be able to give an alternative and partial explanation of
the Lucas puzzle.
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This paper focuses on bank loans to capture funds mobilized by the financial
intermediaries. Figure 1 of the Appendix A section plots the net outflows of bank
loans as percentages of GDP and illustrates how different measures of institutional
quality correlate with net bank outflows. The figures are produced using World
Bank Governance Indicators while the bank flow data are compiled using IMF’s
2010 International Financial Statistics Yearbook2. The scatter plots are overlaid with
quadratic prediction plot which was a better fit than a linear fit (estimated using
ordinary least squares). The non-monotonic relationship is most evident for rule of
law, control of corruption, regulatory quality and government effectiveness. The plots
make evident that specifically countries with very poor and very good institutions
are exporters of financial capital. These two groups of countries are exporters for
different reasons: poor countries do not have the institutional capacity to absorb
capital and use it productively while the richer economies look to diversify their
foreign portfolios and seek higher returns from high growth mid-income economies.
A significant amount of research has been devoted to understanding the forces
behind other types of international capital flows, however, very little has been done
for flows of bank loans. This paper employs, within a small open economy setting,
a costly state verification model based on Williamson (1986) with three modifica-
tions: (1) allowing for endogenous labour input in the monitoring technology, (2)
endogenous investment choice between safe and risky projects, and (3) endogenous
2Lines 78bqd (assets) and 78bud (liabilities) are added to form the net bank loan flows, converted
into domestic currency from US dollars using IFS’ National Currency per U.S. Dollar (period
average) and divided by the nominal GDP (in domestic currency) extracted from IMF’s World
Economic Outlook database. The plotted values are averages for each country for years 1998-
2009. The quadratic fit is estimated using ordinary least squares with the quadratic terms being
statistically significant.
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production scale of risky projects. Monitoring refers to the act of verifying and en-
forcing a contract in a costly state verification (asymmetry of information between
a lender and a borrower). Numerical simulations demonstrate that improvements
in the quality of institutions improve the distributional efficiency of loanable funds
and result in a larger net outflow of capital as a ratio of output in a non-linear
fashion, with the outflow being largest for countries with very poor and very good
institutions. Furthermore, a model that lacks the labour input component in the
monitoring technology predicts somewhat counter intuitively a lower loan interest
rate in a riskier environment. Once labour input is introduced into the monitoring
technology however, the model is then able to generate a loan interest rate profile
which is more in line with the data.
The intuition behind this outcome has to do with the way the financial inter-
mediary responds to higher unit costs due to worsening of the institutional quality.
Because of the diminishing returns to monitoring, the financial intermediary issues
larger loans and less number of loans overall to economize on monitoring costs. With
fewer loans the intermediary increases the cut-off productivity level at which point
loans are declared bankrupt. The contracted loan interest rate, defined in equilib-
rium by the ratio of the cut-off output to loan size, increases as the rise in the cut-off
output level is larger than the increase in the loan size.
During the 20th century, capital mobility levels have been documented to have a
significant upward trend only to be disrupted briefly by the Great Depression and the
Second World War (Taylor, 1996)3. According to Ohanian (2007) gross capital flows
3In fact, during the first half of the 20th century there have been two major incidences of lack
of capital mobility: both World War I (followed by the great depression) and World War II were
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constituted 25% of the world GDP per year between 2000 and 2005 compared to only
9% in 1980. Furthermore, according to the World Bank Development Report, as of
2009, gross private capital flows stood at roughly 33%. More recent history (since the
early 70’s) has witnessed a reborn surge in mobility following the breakdown of the
Bretton Woods system4. However, the distribution of the flows has defied theoretical
predictions in the sense that most of the observed mobility takes place among the
richer countries, while the emerging economies are merely providers of capital to the
mature markets5. In more recent years, gross bank flows (as a % of GDP) have been
the more dominant form of capital mobility (Appendix A Figure 2). Gross bank
flows have equalled or surpassed gross flows of Foreign Direct Investments (both as
a percentage of GDP) in the past decade for the most part. The gross bank loans as
percentage of GDP was indeed quite high at 10%, and it surged to 20% in 2002-2003
and 2007.
One way to exploit the relationship between institutional quality and capital flows
in a model is to introduce a financial intermediation sector that depends on quality
of general institutions. Financial intermediaries accept deposits and issue loans in
order to finance investment while offering a relatively safe return to the depositors6.
Inefficiencies in intermediation, due to poor general institutions (rule of law, control
of corruption etc.), could change the composition of capital flows. Wei and Wu (2002)
superseded by sharp declines in capital mobility, with ”WW I” being preceded by an unprecedented
surge in capital movements which may be partly attributed to government policies of the time
4Since the accord’s dissolution in 1973, private foreign capital flows became the principal sources
of development finance [OECD, 1998]
5IMF Finance and Development, March 2007, Volume 44, Number 1, ”Global Capital Flows:
Defying Gravity”
6Financial intermediation is not a modern concept. Temin (2004) documents the existence and
effectiveness of intermediation during the Roman Empire era
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for example find a positive association between corruption and loan-to-FDI ratio. Ju
and Wei (2006) also show theoretically that investors would engage in FDI and
bypass financial intermediaries if the general institutional framework is good but the
financial intermediaries are weak. The relationship between net bank outflows and
institutional quality indicators tend to be non-monotonic as presented in Figure 1 of
the Appendix A section. While not all institutional measures are equally important
in relation to net flows, the curvatures in general do imply a higher outflow being
associated with extreme values of the institutional quality. The pattern is most
visible particularly with the rule of law, control of corruption, regulatory quality and
government effectiveness indices. The model in this paper is able to fully rationalize
this pattern.
Countries differ in quality of institutions and in legal and regulatory frameworks.
Figure 3 of the Appendix A section clearly shows that more developed economies
tend to have better quality of institutions. It would be of interest to investigate
the rationale behind the positive relationship between a country’s quality of insti-
tutions and its output level, and to explore the effects of improvement in quality of
institutions on a country’s net capital outflows.
Treating the financial intermediary as a decision maker helps with the disaggrega-
tion of the forces behind capital mobility. In order to ease informational asymmetries
(and reap the benefits of risk-pooling and diversification) intermediaries must allevi-
ate the traditional adverse-selection and moral-hazard problems through monitoring
and state verification. Traditionally, starting with the early papers of Diamond
(1984), Boyd and Prescott (1986) and Williamson (1986), the monitoring technol-
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ogy has been assumed fixed and void of any labour input. In contrast, utilizing a
monitoring technology with endogenous labour input is based on the notion that the
intermediary can reduce unit monitoring costs by employing labour. The justifica-
tion is intuitive: in face of higher operating costs of financial intermediary associated
with poor institutions, the intermediary must hire more labour to verify project re-
turns and bankruptcy claims. On the other hand, better institutions help reduce
these costs partially. Adding labour input in fact increases the operating costs of
the financial intermediary, and so labour is added up to a point where the marginal
benefit of adding labour outweighs its marginal cost. In practice, financial interme-
diaries operating in environments with poor institutions cannot rely on the costless
enforcement of contracts and the accuracy of reported project outcomes. Loan offi-
cers act as information verification vehicles and alleviate the information assymetry
to some extend.
Figure 4 of the Appendix A section underlines this fact as it shows the association
between the rule of law and the average loss given default for the financial sector
of each country7. The improvement in intermediation costs as a result of better
institutions is also reflected in the observed lower interest spreads for countries with
better institutions. As can be seen in Figure 5 in the Appendix A section, lower
interest rate spreads (the wedge between the loan and deposit interest rate) are
associated with better enforcement of the rule of law8.
7Strength of rule of law index comes from World Bank’s The Worldwide Governance Indicators
and is defined as “perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police,
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann et. al., 2010) The index
ranges from 0 to 5, with higher scores indicating better institutions.
8Interest rate spread data are taken from Beck et al. (2009)
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Figure 2 of the Appendix A section plots the indexes of institutions by level of
income. As the figure shows, richer economies enjoy better institutions. Lucas (1990)
points to the capital return differentials across countries as the culprit in the puzzle
of limited capital mobility. He then argues that the force of political risk which deters
investments can help explain partly the lack of capital mobility.
To the best of my knowledge this paper is the first of its kind in the capital
mobility literature that attempts to endogenize the labour input for the monitoring
technology while accounting for the quality of general institutions and the level of
technology the intermediary has access to. This is a significant departure from the
literature of the costly-state verification models where the monitoring technology
is fully exogenous. Without the endogenized labour input, as institutional quality
worsens, the unit monitoring cost increases. The financial intermediary issues more
loans but of smaller size in response to a rising unit monitoring cost. The total
monitoring cost drops with the effect of loan size dominating, and the financial
intermediary has to charge a lower loan interest rate to give the borrowers incentives
to report the truth. Thus, the exogenous model predicts that higher unit monitoring
costs are associated with lower loan interest rates which is contrary to the real world
evidence. Endogenizing the labour input in this setting then allows the financial
intermediary to respond to the change in the unit monitoring cost by hiring more
labour for monitoring. The result is a loan interest rate profile that is in line with
the observed pattern in data.
The loan interest rate profile observed in the data is decreasing in institutional
quality (better institutions result in lower interest rates). The model is able to
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replicate this since the lower institutional quality increases unit monitoring costs and
results in for smaller loans but more number of loans in order for the intermediary to
economize on monitoring costs. The cut-off productivity level for bankruptcy would
be higher as a result, and so will be the equilibrium loan interest rate.
The chapter also contributes to the capital mobility literature and speaks to
the Lucas puzzle. It is shown in the existing literature that weak institutions in
poor economies partly explain the lack of flows to these countries. In the context
of bank flows, this model predicts that countries with very poor and very good in-
stitutions export more capital as a ratio of GDP in comparison to countries with
institutional qualities in-between the two. This non-monotonicity is also confirmed
by Imrohoroglu and Kumar (2003) where they predict higher returns for mid-income
countries and lower returns for very poor and very rich economies and thus a subse-
quent flow from rich and poor countries to mid-income. While capital flows from rich
countries in search of higher returns, the same story is not true for poor countries.
The authors show using a calibrated model that because the quality of investment
projects in poor countries is lower, due perhaps to lower levels of financial develop-
ment, capital tends to flow out from the very poor economies also.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a detailed
literature survey, Section 3 presents the set-up of both the exogenous model and the
model with endogenous labour input, Section 4 solves for an equilibrium for each of
the models, Section 5 is devoted to comparative static exercises and discussion of the
results, and finally Section 6 concludes.
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2 Model Set up:
Consider a small open economy with three sectors: households, financial intermedi-
aries and entrepreneurs. The economy can trade in the world markets and takes the
world interest rate as given. I will describe the economic environment, and obtain
predictions on the dynamics of the international flow of funds and the interest rate
spread in response to changes in the quality of general institutions and the level of
technology in the financial sector. For simplicity, the model abstracts away from
money and thus exchange rates. This is not to undermine the relative importance
and role of money within the capital mobility literature. The households live for two
periods: supplying labour while young in the first period of life and consuming their
savings in the second period of life while old. The lifespan of a typical investment
project taken up by an entrepreneur is one period and so is the duration of the loan
issued to the entrepreneur by the financial intermediary. In order to keep the model
simple and do not alter the risk-aversion behaviour of the households we make the
assumption that households cannot choose to be entrepreneurs.
The economy’s time-line is illustrated in Appendix A Figure 6. At the beginning
of period t the households make deposits and the entrepreneurs choose their projects.
The intermediary then allocates the loans. Production occurs, output is realized,
the entrepreneur either pays back the loan or declares bankruptcy, and monitoring
takes place. The intermediary then pays back its liability to the households. The
households consume/save their earnings at the end of period t. The sequence then
repeats itself in t+1 with now the older generation consuming and the new younger
generation working and making deposits.
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2.1 Households:
The economy has an infinite sequence of two-period-lived overlapping generations of
households. All households are identical with the number of households normalized
to one. A new generation of households is born in each period. At time t = 1, the old
agents are endowed with d0 units of funds. Young agents supply labour to the labour
market in period t but do not work when old in period t+1. Households consume
c1,t in period t and c2,t+1 in the subsequent period t + 1. Young agents in period t
make deposits dt with the financial intermediary and withdraw their deposits, plus
accrued interest (1+ rdt+1)dt earned in at period t+1. For a representative household
born in period t, the preferences are given by the following time-separable utility
function:
U(c1,t, c2,t+1, Lt) =
c1−ξ1,t − 1
1− ξ
+ ρ
c1−ξ2,t+1 − 1
1− ξ
+ η
(1− Lt)
1−ξ
1− ξ
,
where, 0 < ξ <∞, 0 < ρ < 1, and 0 < η <∞.
In the equation above, c1,t is the agent’s consumption when she is young and c2,t+1 is
consumption for when she is old. Lt is the agent’s work effort supplied to the labour
market when young. The subjective rate of time preference is denoted by ρ, the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution by 1
ξ
, and η is the weight of leisure in utility.
Households are risk averse as ξ 6= 0. Taking the real wage rate wt and the risk-free
interest rate rdt+1 as given, the representative household of generation t solves the
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following optimization problem:
max
{c1,t,c2,t+1,Lt}
Ut(c1,t, c2,t+1, Lt)
subject to: c1,t +
c2,t+1
1 + rdt+1
= wtLt
where the lifetime budget constraint states that the household’s lifetime consumption
expenditure is equal to its lifetime income.
The first order conditions yield the following equation for the supply of labour:
Lt =
1
1 +
w
ξ−1
ξ
t
η
ρ
1
ξ
( 1
ρ
)
1
ξ +(1+rdt+1)
1−ξ
ξ
, (1)
and the saving decision of the young agent at the end of the period t depends on the
market wage rate and the deposit interest rate,
dt =
wtLt
1 + ρ
−1
ξ (1 + rdt+1)
ξ−1
ξ
. (2)
Wage elasticity of labour supply is negative (∂Lt/∂wt < 0) for ξ > 1 and is zero
when ξ = 1. This indicates that the income effect dominates the substitution effect
and households supply less labour. For ξ > 1, the deposit interest rate elasticity of
labour supply is also negative (∂Lt/∂r
d
t+1 < 0), which indicates that the interest rate
elasticity of deposit supply is positive (∂dt/∂r
d
t+1 > 0); higher deposit interest rate
induces higher supply of deposits by households.
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2.2 Entrepreneur
In each period, a continuum (equal to 1) of entrepreneurs is born and they live for
one period only. The entrepreneurs are assumed to be risk neutral and are exoge-
nously endowed with 1 unit of funds which are not consumable. Each entrepreneur
is endowed with a safe project and a risky project, and can operate only one project
at a time9 but are not identical in terms of the quality of their safe projects.
All projects have a lifetime of one period only; entrepreneurs invest their 1 unit
of funds at the beginning of the period and receive profits at the end of the period.
At the beginning of each period t, each entrepreneur knows the return from the safe
project but faces uncertainty in productivity level of the risky project, and must
choose her project type prior to observing the realization of the productivity level of
the risky project, θt ∈ (0, θ¯).
2.2.1 Safe Project
The safe projects are heterogeneous in terms of quality and the quality is publicly
observable. Each of the safe projects has the certain return x (where x ∈ [x, x¯] is
known before the project choice is made). The distribution of x, G(x), is uniform
and is public knowledge. Each safe project requires 1 unit of fund invested by an
entrepreneur. Since the project is self-financed, the entrepreneur’s profit is the return
of the project πs(x) = x. If an entrepreneur chooses the safe project, she invests her
1 unit of endowed funds at the beginning of the period and consumes the certain
9As per Imrohoroglu and Kumar (2003), a safe project could be one with an older (proven)
technology while a risky project is one which employs newer technology. Although newer technology
may yield higher profits, it is also more likely to fail.
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profit return πs(x) at the end of the period, cst = π
s(x). In summary, all safe projects
are fixed in size and are self-financed.
2.2.2 Risky Project
The risky projects are identical ex ante, while their productivity levels are heteroge-
neous ex post depending on the realization of θt. Risky projects require more than
just the entrepreneur’s 1 unit of funds endowment and if the entrepreneur chooses
the risky project she will need to finance the project using her endowment and bor-
row bt units from the financial intermediary. The total initial investment of 1 + bt
is then used to employ labour le,t and physical capital kt. Physical capital is owned
by the entrepreneurs and depreciates fully at the end of the project’s lifetime. The
entrepreneur therefore faces the following budget constraint:
bt + 1 = kt + wtle,t. (3)
Output is observable at no cost by the entrepreneur at the end of the period and
production takes the following form as such:
f(kt, le,t; θt) = θtAtk
ak
t l
al
e,t At > 0, {ak , al} ∈ [0, 1] (4)
where At is the economy’s total factor productivity and 0 < ak + al < 1 for dimin-
ishing returns. The productivity level of a project is denoted by θt; the entrepreneur
who draws a higher productivity at the beginning of the period is more likely to have
a high enough output to not declare bankruptcy. The return for the risky project is
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therefore stochastic. It is assumed that capital fully depreciates after the production
process.
Productivity θt is randomly drawn from an invariant distribution F (θt), θt ∈
(0, θ¯), and is independent of x (safe project’s return). The realization of θt is unknown
to everyone before the project choice is made and is only costlessly observable by
the entrepreneur privately after she chooses her project and inputs are made. The
output of the risky project is also private information. Everything else is common
knowledge, and the project choice of every entrepreneur is irreversible.
Let θˆt be the cut-off productivity level where projects’ output is just enough to
repay the loans: 

Declare bankruptcy if θt ∈ [0, θˆt)
Non− bankruptcy if θt ∈ [θˆt, θ¯]
In other words, for θt lower than θˆt, output realization is not high enough to pay back
the loan and the entrepreneur must declare bankruptcy to the financial intermediary.
For simplicity, the value of θ¯ is normalized to 1 so that θˆt can be interpreted as the
rate of bankruptcy of the risky projects. All of the risky projects with θt < θˆt will
declare bankruptcy.
In Williamson (1986), there is only one type of project, project size is fixed, and
project returns are stochastic. Therefore, entrepreneurs have no choice over the type
of project they undertake. In this paper however, I have employed a production
function similar to that in Ho (2000) for the risky project as well as a safe project
type to give the entrepreneur a choice. It is noted that all the risky projects are
identical ex-ante (and the same as in the formulation in Williamson (1986)). With
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the endogenous choice between safe and risky projects, the number of risky projects
undertaken therefore varies. With the endogenous project sizes, and even though
all risky projects are funded by the financial intermediary, credit rationing could
still occur in term of the loan amount; entrepreneurs may receive a loan size smaller
than they would like. If an entrepreneur chooses to operate a risky project then the
problem facing the entrepreneur would be:
E[πe] = max
kt,le,t
∫ 1
θˆt
[
θtAtk
ak
t l
al
e,t − bt(1 + r
e
t )
]
dθt
Subject to: 1 + bt = wtle,t + kt
and θˆtAtk
ak
t l
al
e,t = bt(1 + r
e
t ).
Given the loan size bt and interest rate r
e
t , the entrepreneur chooses inputs kt and
le,t to maximize the expected profits E[π
e]. Evaluating the integral and using the
second constraint the expected pay-off from a risky project becomes:
E[πe] =
1
2
[1− θˆt]
2Atk
ak
t l
al
e,t (5)
where θˆt is defined by
θˆtAtk
ak
t l
al
e,t = bt(1 + r
e
t ). (6)
The expected profit of the risky project given by Equation 5 is decreasing in θˆt and
note that E[πe|θˆt = 1] = 0. In other words, the higher is the cut-off productivity
level, the lower is the expected profit of a risky project. In equation (6), ret is the loan
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interest rate the entrepreneur must repay the financial intermediary. The right-hand
side of the equation is the output of the risky project with productivity level θˆt that
is just enough to repay the loan.
2.2.3 Project Choice
The safe project return is characterized by a known x while the risky project is
characterized by the unknown θt and the distributions of each are independent. The
entrepreneur optimally decides which type of project to undertake after the obser-
vation of its x but before the realization of θt. In particular, the entrepreneur will
choose the risky project if the following inequality holds:
E[πe] ≥ x (7)
which states that should the expected profit of the risky project not be high enough
the entrepreneur will prefer the safe project. In the extreme case that E[πe] > x¯
then all entrepreneurs will take on the risky projects. In contrast, when E[πe] < x,
in a climate with very high business risks, entrepreneurs unanimously choose safer
projects to pursue. The entrepreneur’s problem is therefore to maximize her expected
return (prior to observing the realization of θt) by choosing a safe or a risky project:
He ≡ max{x,E[π
e]} given the constraints (5) and (6) and taking the loan size and
interest rate {bt, r
e
t} as well as wt the wage rate as given.
As illustrated in Appendix A Figure 7, given that the safe project return is
uniformly distributed over the interval [x, x¯], the fraction of entrepreneurs who take
on the risky projects (those with x < E[πe]) is equal to φt =
E[pie]−x
x¯−x
(0 < φt ≤ 1).
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The larger is the wedge between the expected profit E[πe] and the lower bound return
on safe projects x, the higher will be the number of entrepreneurs who take on risky
projects.
2.3 Financial Intermediary
The financial intermediary is an economic agent who maximizes the expected return
to the entrepreneur within a perfect competition setting and whose primary role is
to allocate savings towards more productive investments. It does so by accepting
deposits from households and making loans to entrepreneurs. They also have access
to international credit market, channelling funds from the international credit market
to finance domestic investment, or the excess funds from the domestic credit market
to lending abroad.
It has been shown in the literature that intermediaries reduce socially unnecessary
capital liquidation and shift composition of savings towards more productive capital
(Bencivenga and Smith, 1991). However in this model, time frames of investments are
homogeneous that there is no differentiation between liquid and illiquid investments.
Therefore, the primary channel for enhancing investments is through improved risk
diversification which induces entrepreneurs to choose risky projects over the safe
projects with low returns.
In this paper, all financial intermediaries are identical and behave competitively.
In general however, countries vastly differ in quality of institutions, depth and struc-
ture of financial markets, and in their finance-specific legal and regulatory framework.
For our purposes, the exogenous components are disaggregated into quality of general
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institutions and level of finance-related technologies. This distinction is integral to
the analysis. The working mechanism of intermediaries is intuitive: in face of higher
costs due to more uncertainty or poorer institutional environment, intermediaries’
hire more loan officers to verify project returns and bankruptcy claims. Improvement
in the intermediaries’ monitoring technology allows them to reduce the number of
loan officers.
Following Diamond (1984) and Williamson (1986), intermediation endogenously
dominates direct lending in equilibrium10. Because there are idiosyncratic risks,
risk-pooling is necessary and the financial intermediary collects information in or-
der to maximize entrepreneur’s profits by minimizing losses from lending to risky
investments. Financial intermediaries allocate deposits amongst a large number of
entrepreneurs, diversifying the risk. As a result, they can provide depositors with
a non-contingent interest payment of rdt at each period t which is paid only after
collecting loan repayments from the entrepreneurs.
The financial intermediary makes loans of size bt to entrepreneurs at date t with
the interest rate ret , which is collected only when project returns are realized at the
end of the period and only if the project return is higher than the cut-off expressed
in equation (6). The optimal loan contract is therefore characterized by {bt, r
e
t}.
Rationing happens only on the intensive margin and all entrepreneurs who choose
to operate a risky project receive the same rationed loan size, bt.
In the model with endogenous labour input to monitoring, given that the inter-
mediary’s labour input lf,t has been in place, should the project realization be lower
10While Diamond (1984) simply assumes the existence of financial intermediaries, Williamson
(1986) shows they arise endogenously.
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than the cut-off level, the amount of resources the intermediary will dedicate to mon-
itoring will partly depend on the level of labour input, lf,t, and partly on exogenous
institutional quality and technological level of the financial intermediation sector.
An improvement in regulatory framework or institutional quality will be captured
by a decrease in z. It is noted that the labour cost wtlf,t is like an upfront cost in the
set up with endogenous labour input to financial intermediation. As such, the mon-
itoring technology, M(lf,t; z, µ), can take on two functional forms in this paper: one
exogenous and one with endogenized labour input. In the exogenous case, the cost z
governed by the quality of general institutions is taken as given by the intermediary
and there is nothing it can do to reduce or influence it. In the endogenized labour
input case however, the financial intermediary will take as given the costs associated
with the quality of institutions (captured by z) as well as the monitoring technology
it has access to (captured by µ) and chooses the optimum level of labour input to
affect the unit monitoring cost.
In the case of the entrepreneur declaring bankruptcy, the financial intermediary
engages in monitoring the project and incurs a monitoring cost while liquidating
the output. In other words, monitoring decision is made ex-post as in Williamson
(1987) rather than ex-ante. As a result there are no adverse selection problems given
that there are no ex-ante information asymmetries. Because productivity draws are
exogenous and project returns cannot be influenced by the entrepreneur, there are
no moral hazard problems in this type of setup either. The zero-profit condition for
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the financial intermediary in period t is given by:
∫ θˆt
0
[θtAtk
ak
t l
al
e,t −M(lf,t; z, µ)bt] dθt +
∫ 1
θˆt
bt(1 + r
e
t )dθt − wtlf,t = bt(1 + r
d
t+1) (8)
Using (3) and (6), it can be simplified to:
(θˆt −
θˆ2t
2
)Atk
ak
t l
al
t − (kt + wtle,t − 1)
[
θˆtM(lf,t; z, µ) + (1 + r
d
t )
]
− wtlf,t = 0 (9)
where,
M(lf,t; z, µ) = z and, lf,t = 0, for the exogenous model, and
M(lf,t; z, µ) = z − µl
σ
f,t and, lf,t > 0, for the endogenous model.
The first term on the left-hand side of equation (8) is total liquidated output the
financial intermediary collects from bankruptcy-declared projects net of the mon-
itoring cost M(lf,t, z) × bt. The intermediary hires labour lf,t for monitoring and
collecting interest revenue and its monitoring cost efficiency is subject to exogenous
factors such as institutional quality and regulations which are captured by the param-
eter z. The second term in equation (8) is the revenues collected from non-bankrupt
loans and the third term is the labour costs wtlf,t incurred. Finally, the term on the
right-hand side is the financial intermediary’s liability; the promised risk-free return
on deposits made by households. Equation (9) is a simpler representation of the
zero-profit condition: collected revenues are equal to the sum of the cost of funds
and the costs associated with monitoring. In the next section, after setting up the
model using an exogenous version ofM(lf,t; z, µ) followed by an endogenized version,
some numerical exercises are presented. Given the non-linearity of the equilibrium
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equations, analytical solutions cannot be derived.
2.3.1 Exogenous Monitoring Technology
As mentioned before, efficiency of the financial intermediaries is assumed to be a
function of country-specific characteristics such as the legal system and institutions
(Levine, 1997). That is why monitoring cost has always been assumed to be exoge-
nous in most models of financial intermediation (Williamson (1986), Imrohoroglu and
Kumar (2003), Alessandria and Qian (2005)). The monitoring costs are decreasing
in quality of institutions as shown empirically by Kunt et al. (2003). The authors
use data from 72 countries and find a negative relationship between intermediation
costs and improving financial intermediation regulations and national institutions.
Therefore, in this model I let z captures the unit monitoring costs and in essence
represents the regulatory effects (financial intermediary entry restrictions, reserve
requirements, restrictions on financial intermediary’s activities, financial interme-
diation freedom etc.) as well as the institutional effects (property rights, political
stability, government effectiveness etc.). It is noted that in the literature most studies
assume a fixed project size and a fixed monitoring cost. In this paper, the monitoring
cost of a risky project with loan size bt is zbt.
Following with that line of the literature and taking a constant monitoring unit
cost,M(lf,t; z, µ) = z, the distinction between the financial intermediary’s technology
level (µ) and the general institutional framework (z) vanishes and only to be reintro-
duced in the next section under an endogenous monitoring function. The problem
faced by the intermediary is to maximize the expected return to the entrepreneur by
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choosing capital kt, labour le,t, and θˆt
11:
max
{kt,le,t,θˆt}
1
2
(1− θˆ)2Atk
ak
t l
al
e,t (10)
subject to
(θˆt −
θˆ2t
2
)Atk
ak
t l
al
t = (kt + wtle,t − 1)
[
θˆtz + (1 + r
d
t )
]
(11)
where the cutoff productivity level θˆt determines the number of project being mon-
itored and liquidated, and the intermediary’s revenue is just enough to cover the
monitoring cost and repayment to depositors. The first-order conditions for kt, le,t,
and θˆt are respectively given by:
ak
2
(1− θˆt)
2Atk
ak−1
t l
al
e,t + λt
[
ak(θˆt −
θˆ2t
2
)Atk
ak−1
t l
al
e,t − [θˆtz + (1 + r
d
t )]
]
= 0 (12)
al
2
(1− θˆt)
2Atk
ak
t l
al−1
e,t + λt
[
al(θˆt −
θˆ2t
2
)Atk
ak
t l
al−1
e,t − wt[θˆtz + (1 + r
d
t )]
]
= 0 (13)
−(1 − θˆt)Atk
ak
t l
al
e,t + λt
[
(1− θˆ)Atk
ak
t l
al
e,t − (kt + wtle,t − 1)z
]
= 0 (14)
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the zero-profit condition (11).
Combining equations (12) and (14) yields:
ak
2
Atk
ak
t l
al
t =
[
θˆtkt +
ak
2
(1− θˆt)(kt + wtle,t − 1)
]
z + (1 + rdt )kt (15)
11As per Diamond (1984), perfect competition in the loan market implies that financial intermedi-
aries have to maximize the expected return their borrowers while making zero profit. Therefore, the
intermediary maximizes the expected profit of the entrepreneur with respect to its own zero-profit
condition
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and similarly, using (13) and (14):
al
2
Atk
ak
t l
al
t =
[
θˆtwtle,t +
al
2
(1− θˆt)(kt + wtle,t − 1)
]
z + (1 + rdt )wtle,t (16)
The left-hand side of equation (15) is the output share of capital which is the benefit
of employing kt units of capital. The right-hand side is the cost of monitoring and
employing capital with the first term being the cost of informational asymmetries
and the second term being the cost of fund facing the intermediary. We could also
interpret the right-hand side of equation (15) as the expected monitoring cost for the
loan to finance kt, θˆtktz, plus the cost of funds of borrowing kt facing the intermediary,
(1 + rdt )kt, and the wedge to the entrepreneur to induce truth-telling and avoid
unnecessary liquidation, ak
2
(1 − θˆt)(kt + wtle,t − 1)z. Equation (16) is interpreted
similarly with wtle,t replacing kt and al replacing ak. Subsequently, the relationship
between the marginal rate of technical substitution and the unit input costs comes
from equations (12) and (13):
al
ak
kt
le,t
= wt (17)
In this setting, the ex ante interest-rate spread is defined as the difference between
the lending interest rate and the deposit interest rate:
ret − r
d
t =
θˆtAtk
ak
t l
al
t
kt + wtle,t − 1
− (1 + rdt ). (18)
It is evident from equation (18) above that as ret falls, the ratio of cut-off output to
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loan size must fall at the same (higher) rate for the spread to not change (narrow
down). Furthermore, the international net outflow of funds is captured by the resid-
ual term dt − φtbt which is the difference between the total available deposits in the
economy, dt, and the total amount of funds loaned out to fund the risky projects,
φtbt. Equations (15)–(17) define the optimal debt contract and characterize kt, le,t
and θˆt and govern the loan interest rate r
e
t profile as well as the loan size bt.
2.3.2 Endogenous Monitoring Technology
In contrast to the section above, the per unit monitoring cost denoted asM(lf,t; z, µ)
is taken to be a function of labour hired for monitoring (which the intermediary can
choose optimally) and two parameters capturing the exogenous forces (such as insti-
tutional, legal or government regulations as well as the financial sector’s information
technology level):
M(lf,t, ; z, µ) = z − µl
σ
f,t (19)
where σ is a proxy for labour-elasticity of information production and lf,t is the
endogenized labour input. The information production µlσf,t counters the amount of
resources required (z) for monitoring and it does so by combining labour lf,t with
intermediation sector’s level of technology µ. The unit monitoring cost, M(lf,t; z, µ),
is therefore decreasing in this production function at a diminishing rate since we
assume σ < 1 as in Greenwood et al. (2010).
This form of the monitoring technology allows for disaggregation of the general
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institutional quality12, z, from the level of information technology available to the
financial intermediary, µ. Higher values of z indicate less developed general in-
stitutional levels, resulting in a higher unit cost for the financial intermediary as
mentioned before. However, the intermediary also benefits from some level of mon-
itoring technology which is assumed to be exogenously given and is captured by µ
and works in the opposite direction of z in reducing the unit monitoring cost.
Numerous papers have shown that evolution of the information technology sec-
tor as well as the advancements in statistical analysis and risk management have
resulted in higher efficiency of the financial intermediation sector. Furlong (2001)
finds that banks generally invest more heavily in information technology before other
industries do. Hitt et al. (1998) show that investment in employees that specialize
in information technology is in fact efficiency augmenting. Finally, Berger (2002)
concludes that the general consensus of the literature is that there are improvements
in costs from technological advancements.
As financial intermediaries engage in more monitoring, more labour is demanded,
and per unit cost of monitoring falls due to the higher degree of specialization:
∂M(lf,t;z,µ)
∂lf,t
< 0 and
∂M(lf,t;z,µ)
2
∂2lf,t
> 0 (diminishing returns). The upfront labour cost
wtlf,t is independent of whether the project fails (bankruptcy case) or not. The
intermediary will hire labour up to the point where the marginal cost of labour is
equal to the marginal benefit from monitoring. As such, monitoring can be adjusted
in two dimensions. First, through adjustments in the cut-off productivity level for
12Kunt et al. (2003) also find empirically that “bank regulations reflect broader national institu-
tions associated with the protection of private property rights and the freedom to compete in the
economy” and so bank-specific regulations become insignificant in explaining intermediation costs
once accounting for general institutions
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bankruptcy and monitoring, θˆt, which is the common approach within the literature.
Secondly, through adjusting the unit cost of monitoring by changing the labour input
lf,t which is unique to this model and has not been explored in the existing literature.
The financial intermediary, taking rdt+1 (world interest rate) and wt (market wage)
as given, faces the following optimization problem:
max
{kt,le,t,lf,t,θˆ}
1
2
(1− θˆ)2Atk
ak
t l
al
e,t (20)
subject to
(θˆt −
θˆ2t
2
)Atk
ak
t l
al
t = (kt + wtle,t − 1)
[
(z − µlσf,t)θˆt + (1 + r
d
t )
]
+ wtlf,t (21)
Let λˆt be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the financial intermediary’s zero
profit condition. The first-order conditions are similar to before with one extra
equation for lf,t since it is determined endogenously now:
ak
2
(1− θˆt)
2Atk
ak−1
t l
al
e,t + λˆt
[
ak(θˆt −
θˆ2t
2
)Atk
ak−1
t l
al
e,t − [(z − µl
σ
f,t)θˆt + (1 + r
d
t )]
]
= 0 (22)
al
2
(1− θˆt)
2Atk
ak
t l
al−1
e,t + λˆt
[
al(θˆt −
θˆ2t
2
)Atk
ak
t l
al−1
e,t − wt[(z − µl
σ
f,t)θˆt + (1 + r
d
t )]
]
= 0 (23)
−(1− θˆt)k
ak
t l
al
e,t + λˆt
[
(1− θˆt)Atk
ak
t l
al
e,t − (kt + wtle,t − 1)(z − µl
σ
f,t)
]
= 0 (24)
(kt + wtle,t − 1)σµl
σ−1
f,t θˆt = wt (25)
The left-hand side of equation (25) is the marginal product of labour hired to monitor
projects (the reduction in the marginal cost of monitoring multiplied by the loan size
and the measure of projects declaring bankruptcy). As in the previous model, the
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first two first-order conditions, equations (22) and (23), yield:
akwtle,t = alkt (26)
while (22) and (24) simplify to:
ak
2
Atk
ak
t l
al
e,t =
[
θˆtkt +
ak
2
(1− θˆt)(kt + wtle,t − 1)
]
(z − µlσf,t) + (1 + r
d
t )kt (27)
and using (23) and (24):
al
2
Atk
ak
t l
al
t =
[
θˆtwtle,t +
al
2
(1− θˆt)(kt + wtle,t − 1)
]
(z − µlσf,t) + (1 + r
d
t )wtle,t (28)
The first terms on the right-hand side of both equations (27) and (28) are again
costs of imperfect information to capital and labour subsequently. Equations (25)–
(28) define the optimal debt contract which characterizes kt, le,t, lf,t and θˆ and governs
the interest rate re,t and the loan size bt.
3 Equilibrium
In closing the model I resort to using the endogenous form of the unit monitoring
cost, M(lf,t; z, µ) = z−µl
σ
f,t. The arguments here hold for both models if the reader
keeps in mind that in the exogenous cost model, there is no labour input for the
financial intermediary: lf,t = 0. Labour market must clear in equilibrium. The sum
of labour demanded by the financial intermediary sector and by the entrepreneurs,
weighted by the total number of risky projects, must equal the total labour supplied
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by the households. The weighting is necessary as the labour hired (le,t or lf,t) is in
fact per unit of loan and needs to be aggregated.
φt(le,t + lf,t) = Lt (29)
The loan market should also be closed in the closed economy case: dt = φtbt. Using
equations (1) and (3), the loan market clearing condition for the closed economy is:
(
1
2
(1− θˆt)
2Atk
ak
t l
al
e,t − x
x¯− x
)
(kt + wtle,t − 1) = dt =
wtLt
1 + ρ
−1
ξ (1 + rdt+1)
ξ−1
ξ
. (30)
where the fraction of entrepreneurs choosing the risky investments is rewritten as:
φt =
E[πe]− x
x¯− x
=
1
2
(1− θˆt)
2Atk
ak
t l
al
e,t − x
x¯− x
. (31)
However, given that the interest of this paper lies in the case of a small open-economy,
the equality will not hold and the gap would be filled by inflows or outflows of capital.
The small open economy takes rdt as given and determines the international capital
inflows, φtbt − dt, endogenously. Finally, the total output of this small economy is
given by the sum of the output of the safe and risky projects, less the resources spent
on monitoring:
Yt = {Y
safe
t }+ {Y
risky
t }
= {
1
2
(x¯2 −E[πe]2)}+ {φtAtk
ak
t l
al
e,t − φt(θˆtMtbt + wtlf,t)}
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Given the parameters of the model, an equilibrium is the set of variables wt, lf,t,
le,t, kt, φt, θˆt, Lt, and dt, which satisfy the following system of equations:
(θˆt −
θˆ2t
2
)Atk
ak
t l
al
e,t = (kt + wtle,t − 1)
[
(z − µlσf,t)θˆt + (1 + r
d
t )
]
+ wtlf,t (32)
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2
(1− θˆt)(kt + wtle,t − 1)
]
(z − µlσf,t) + (1 + r
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t )kt (33)
(kt + wtle,t − 1)σµl
σ−1
f,t θˆt = wt (34)
φt =
1
2
(1− θˆt)
2Atk
ak
t l
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e,t − x
x¯− x
(35)
φt(le,t + lf,t) = Lt (36)
akwtle,t = alkt (37)
dt =
wtLt
1 + ρ
−1
ξ (1 + rdt+1)
ξ−1
ξ
(38)
Lt =
1
1 +
w
ξ−1
ξ
t
η
ρ
1
ξ
( 1
ρ
)
1
ξ +(1+rdt+1)
1−ξ
ξ
(39)
The entrepreneur’s expected return can be rewritten using equations (27), (28) and
(32):
E[πe] =
1
2
Atk
ak
t l
al
e,t(1− ak − al) + [M(lf,t; z, µ)θˆt + 1 + r
d
t ]
+[
ak + al
2
(1− θˆt)(kt + wtle,t − 1)M(lf,t; z, µ)− wtlf,t] (40)
where the first term is the fair share of output allocated to the entrepreneur, the
second term is the return to the entrepreneur’s internal fund and the last term is the
extra payment to the entrepreneur as an incentive to tell the truth.
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4 Comparative Statics
As mentioned before, in order to better understand the role of institutions and estab-
lish a link between the institutional framework and financial intermediation sector,
the monitoring cost function must be endogenized. Taking the deposit interest rate
(rdt ) as exogenously given, a comparison between the model with endogenized labour
input to monitoring against the model with exogenous monitoring is of interest to
realize the gains from this modification. In general, the results indicate that the endo-
genized labour input to monitoring technology matters and has serious implications.
Once the validity of this approach is verified, using the endogenized model, certain
comparative statics are derived numerically with respect to the changing quality of
institutions as well as the elasticity of labour input for the financial intermediary (to
verify robustness).
4.1 Parameter Values
I have used three different values for the financial intermediary’s monitoring tech-
nology level (µ) and have also let the institutional parameter (z) to vary in order to
focus the results on the response of the endogenous variables to the changing tech-
nology level and the changing quality of institutions, holding all parameters of other
sectors of the economy constant. The µ parameter takes on values 12, 14, and 16 (a
higher value reflects access to better bank-specific technology) in order to produce
loan interest rate values which are reasonable. However, these values are arbitrary
and do not seem to affect the qualitative results. Given the shape of the monitoring
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technology function, M(lf,t; z, µ) = z−µl
σ
f,t, higher values of µ imply access to better
technology level as they reduce the monitoring cost: ∂M
∂µ
= −lσf,t < 0. The moni-
toring technology is linear and directly proportional in parameter z representing the
quality of institutions in the monitoring technology, ∂M
∂z
= 1. Consequently, unlike
the technology parameter, the higher the value of z is, the higher are the associated
monitoring costs. Again, the 2.5 to 4.5 range for the z values is not calibrated and is
arbitrarily set to produce reasonable loan interest rate values. While different values
of µ change the curvature of the unit monitoring cost, the z values will only result
in level effects.
Finally, to assess the sensitivity of the results with respect to the proxy for the
elasticity of labour (σ) in the monitoring technology function, I use arbitrary values
of 0.3 and 0.7. Some results are responsive to these values and in particular the
direction of net international capital flows as a percentage of total output changes
(with details discussed in section 5.2). Capital outflows within the setting of the
model are defined as the residuals of available funds (deposits) after projects are
funded. In this model dt and φtbt are chosen by different agents so that the inter-
temporal aspects of saving and investment are not the same as other standard models
with agents making savings and investment decisions contemporaneously. Flows as
percentage of total output are calculated using the sum of the safe and risky project
outputs as the measure for total domestic output.
The discussion of the results starts with a look at the loan interest rate profile
and how the model predictions fare against real world data. Table 1 of the Appendix
B section summarizes the parameter values employed for performing the numerical
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exercises. The elasticity of capital (ak) and labour (al) are set to 0.3 and 0.65 which
are within the range of values suggested within the literature and the total factor
productivity (At) is set to 1 for simplicity. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution
(1/ǫ) is accepted in the literature to be larger than one and so we set it equal to
1.04 in order to ensure the model predicts reasonable values for the loan interest rate
profile. The subjective discount rate ρ is set to 0.96 to be in line with accepted range
of discount rate values for a 1-year time period (see Frederick et al., 2002 for details).
The deposit interest rate is equal to 2% which is roughly the historical return of the
U.S. Treasury Bill rate. As such, the lower bound for the safe project is set slightly
higher at 5% and the upper bound is set to 15% (in order to produce reasonable loan
interest rate values).
Table 2 of the Appendix B section summarizes the simulation results for the
exogenous model while Tables 3 and 4 summarize the simulations for the endogenous
models with σ = 0.3 and σ = 0.7 respectively.
4.2 The Loan Interest Rate Profile
This section is in essence a comparison of the exogenous and the endogenous models
in their predictions of the interest rate spread. The generated loan interest rate profile
is essentially what sets the two models apart. Unlike the conventional exogenous
model, the model with endogenous labour input to the monitoring technology is able
to produce a loan interest profile consistent with real world observed data. As is
evident in Figure 5 of the Appendix A section which is produced using the World
Bank Governance Indicators and the interest rate spread data compiled by Beck
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et al. (2009), one can observe an expected negative relationship between the two
variables. The better the quality of institutions the higher the index of rule of law
(which equates to a lower value of ”z” in the model), the lower is the interest rate
margin. Better institutions are one of the driving forces behind the lower monitoring
costs in cases of declared bankruptcy. Resources are better allocated and therefore
the financial intermediaries require less labour input and face lower monitoring costs
overall. Given the decreasing returns in the production function of the risky project,
it will be beneficial to the intermediary to fund more projects with smaller loan sizes.
Should more projects default however, then the monitoring cost will be higher.
Using the parameter values shown in Table 1 (Appendix B), the numerical ex-
ercises show that under the endogenous model, the loan interest rate is increasing
as quality of institutions deteriorate (increase in z). The financial intermediary can
respond to a deteriorating institutional condition through loan rationing as well as
through adjusting the monitoring intensity endogenously. As the unit cost of moni-
toring rises due to an increase in z, the financial intermediary is induced to hire more
labour (lf,t) to reduce the unit cost to some degree (Figure 8 of the Appendix A).
Due to the diminishing returns to monitoring, the financial intermediary also has to
adjust by issuing larger loans (higher bt), loosening the rationing on the intensive
margin while tightening the rationing on the extensive margin (lower φt) as seen on
Figure 9 of the Appendix A section. With few loans (lower φt) the intermediary can
increase the cut-off productivity level θˆt (Figure 10 of the Appendix A section). The
contracted loan interest rate, 1 + ret = (θˆtAtk
ak
t l
al
e,t)/bt, increases as the rise in the
cut-off output level is larger than the increase in the loan size.
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On the contrary, the loan interest rate profile generated using the exogenous
model is decreasing in the quality of institutions: intermediaries with access to poorer
institutions (higher z) offer loans at a lower interest rate (Appendix A: Figure 11).
This prediction is contrary to the data. Recall that the exogenous monitoring tech-
nology is simply M(lf,t; z, µ, σ) = z, and so the intermediary is not able to adjust the
unit cost by injecting labour (lf,t = 0). The financial intermediary hence funds more
projects but with a smaller loan size. To economize on the monitoring costs, the
productivity cut-off level for bankruptcy, θˆt, is lower and hence the loan interest rate
has to be set lower. This however, as mentioned before, is counter-intuitive since
under conditions of poor institutions, the data show a higher interest rate spread
(Appendix A Figure 5). The monitoring technology with endogenous input there-
fore significantly improves the prediction of the model and brings it more in line
with the pattern observed in the real world. Since the risk-free interest rate, rdt , is
fixed in a small open economy framework, the loan interest rate spread, ret − r
d
t also
exhibits the same pattern as the lending interest rate ret . Furthermore, combining
Figures 4 and 5 of Appendix A, both loss given default (monitoring cost) and the
interest rate spread are decreasing in quality of institutions; in other words, higher
monitoring costs are associated with higher interest rate spreads. Figures 12(a) and
12(b) of Appendix A replicate this association while 12(c) does not as it pertains to
the exogenous model.
Since the endogenous model conforms better to real world data, I will focus
on this model in the following discussions. It is of interest to see how the model
performs in environments where monitoring technology improves or where the quality
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of institutions changes. In the following section these two forces are investigated in
order to study their implications on the direction of capital flows.
4.3 International Capital Flows
As stated before, net international capital outflows are defined as a residual of funds;
left over of domestic deposits (savings) once all domestic projects are funded and
loans are issued (investment). It is noted that the supply and demand of funds
do not include the entrepreneurs’ internal funds. There are three variations13 of
this measure which can be of interest: net difference, dt − φtbt, net difference as a
percentage of output,dt−φtbt
Yt
, and the savings-investment ratio, dt
φtbt
. The savings-
investment ratio (also known as the Aizenman’s self-financing ratio)14 is constructed
as the ratio of total deposits to total loans issued to finance risky projects: dt
φtbt
, and it
is often used to capture “the intertemporal aspects of savings and investments” which
however are not the focus of this paper. As such, in this paper the net international
flows, and in particular, the net international flows as a ratio of GDP (dt−φtbt
Yt
) are
used to gauge the performance of the financial sector.
Figures 13 and 14 of the Appendix A section summarize the results and are
comparable to Figure 1 of the Appendix A Section.
4.3.1 Changes in the Technology Level (µ)
The exercise here focuses on holding the quality of institutions z fixed while allowing
for the technology level µ to differ. In general, changes in the technology level the
13In the empirical literature these measures are used interchangeably.
14Aizenman, Pinto and Radziwill (2004)
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financial intermediary has access to will result in level effects mostly. The better the
monitoring technology is, the lesser is the need for labour input by the intermediary
(Appendix A: Figure 8). To best see the underlying reasons, consider a micro-
finance institution in a poor country with poor monitoring technology. With micro-
finance loans, loan officers have to travel to villages and meet with each entrepreneur
declaring bankruptcy in person to verify project returns. If however the financial
intermediary can monitor these entrepreneurs remotely, it will reduce its labour
force. The financial intermediary then can issue more loans, taking advantage of the
economies of scale the monitoring technology offers.
Thus, as the monitoring technology µ improves, more loans are issued, φt increases
(Appendix A Figure 9), while rationing is intensified on the intensive margin, bt
decreases (Appendix A Figure 15), and the total loan supply, φtbt, decreases as a
result. Alternatively, domestic deposit dt decreases by a smaller proportion than the
decrease in φtbt, resulting in an increase in capital outflows. Overall, holding z fixed
while increasing µ, the model predicts a larger outflow of capital, both “net” and
as a percentage of output (Appendix A: Figures 13 and 14). The total amount of
intermediated loans drops, which implies that the rationing on the intensive margin
dominates the increase in the total number of loans funded (the extensive margin).
However, total output increases, which is an indication that higher quality projects
are funded, which in turn is a result of the financial intermediary having access to
better monitoring technologies. Consider a poor country where intermediaries have
access to poor technologies. Net international capital outflows would be lower for this
type of economy compared to the one with better technologies. Naturally, this by no
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means is the complete picture as these countries also suffer from lower managerial
abilities and TFP levels (Silva, 2010).
4.3.2 Changes in the Institutional Quality Level (z)
While holding the technology level µ fixed, I allow z to vary in order to be able to
study the changes in capital flows in response to different institutional quality levels.
This is one dimension in particular where the two models diverge in prediction as
Figures 13 and 14 in the Appendix A section make clear. For higher values of z, the
intermediary employs more labour per unit of loan in order to reduce the monitoring
costs (Appendix A Figure 8). To cut costs, the intermediary will issue fewer loans,
increase the loan size, and increase the cut-off productivity level for bankruptcy.
Recall that the model is a small open economy and thus subject to the world interest
rate, rdt = r
w
t . Rewriting equation (32):
(θˆt −
θˆ2t
2
)Atk
ak
t l
al
e,t = btMtθˆt + bt(1 + r
d
t ) + wtlf,t (41)
where, Mt = z − µl
σ
f,t
and, θˆtAtk
ak
t l
al
e,t = bt(1 + r
e
t ).
Equation (41) is the zero-profit condition for the financial intermediary and it deter-
mines the cut-off productivity level θˆt. The term on the left-hand side is the sum of
the repayments from projects with θt ≥ θˆt and the liquidated output collected from
the projects with θt < θˆt declaring bankruptcy. The right-hand side constitutes the
monitoring cost, the cost of funds and the cost of labour of the financial intermediary.
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As the cut-off productivity level for bankruptcy θˆt rises, the expected profit of the
risky projects fall. At the same time, because of a larger loan size, the entrepreneur
employs more capital and labour which in turn drives up the expected profit. Overall
between the two opposing forces, the effect of the cut-off productivity dominates and
expected profit falls. With lower expected profit from taking up the risky projects,
some entrepreneurs prefer to operate their safe projects, total output will be lower.
Focusing first on the model with endogenous labour input into the monitoring
technology, net international capital outflow, dt − φtbt, drops as a result of weaker
institutions (Figures 13(a) and (b) of Appendix A). That is partly because of the
drop in deposits, dt. In particular, while the labour input per unit of loan (lf,t)
and per project (le,t) both increase, the overall labour demand falls because of lower
number of risky projects operated (lower φt), and the wage rate (wt) falls. The lower
labour demand and lower wage rate together result in a lower supply of deposits (dt).
The other channel through which the capital outflows are affected are through
the total loans issued, φtbt. For lower values of σ, total loans increase as z increases
(poorer institutions) while for higher values of σ, total loans drop. In the former case
where φtbt increases, the effect of loan size dominates: fewer risky loans are issued
(lower φt) but the loan size is larger (larger bt). For higher values of σ the situation
is reversed with the decrease in number of loans (lower φt) dominating the increase
in loan size (larger bt).
The explanation of the observed opposing forces above (between φt and bt) has
to do with the effectiveness of labour input into the monitoring technology. As the
unit monitoring cost increases (higher Mt) due to an increase in z, the financial in-
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termediary hires more labour (higher lf,t) to counter the increase in unit monitoring
cost (Figures 8(a) and (b) of Appendix A). The financial intermediary hires more
labour as the marginal benefit of monitoring outweighs the marginal costs of moni-
toring. The additional labour enables the intermediary to overcome the institutional
deficiencies such as poor contract enforcements for example.
For larger values of σ, labour input does not increase much and unit monitoring
cost still increases. As such, the financial intermediary issues fewer but larger loans
since the increase in labour input in monitoring is not as effective as it would have
been when σ is low. For either values of σ the residual of funds (dt − φtbt) is
falling even though the adjustments are slightly different due to the differences in
the effectiveness of labour input into the monitoring technology.
In contrast to the models with endogenous labour input, the exogenous model
predicts an increase in capital outflow as institutions worsen (higher z). With higher
unit monitoring costs (higher Mt where Mt = z), the financial intermediary issues
more loans (higher φt) but with a smaller loan size (lower bt). The effect of the
decrease in loan size dominates the increase in the number of loans, resulting in a
lower level of total loans issued (lower φtbt). Domestic deposits, dt, are lower since
with smaller loan sizes (bt), less labour is hired (lower le,t) and the wage rate, wt, is
lower. While both deposits and total loans fall, the drop in total loans dominates,
and the surplus of deposits flowing out of the economy, dt − φtbt, increases.
The exogenous model and the models with endogenous labour each provide con-
trasting predictions in terms of net outflows. In order to see which model is better
able to replicate the stylized facts presented in Figure 1 of Appendix A, the model
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predictions in terms of net capital outflow as percentage of output (dt−φtbt
Yt
) are pre-
sented (Appendix A, Figure 14). Since the numerator (net outflows) was discussed
in detail above, we can turn our attention to the denominator (total output) first
before we can evaluate the whole ratio.
Figures 16(a, b and c) of Appendix A reveal the models’ prediction in terms of
total output (sum of safe and risky projects’ outputs). Across all models and for
all parameter values output increases as institutional quality improves (z drops).
This is consistent with the stylized facts presented in Figure 3 (Appendix A) where
higher income is associated with higher scores for institutional quality. There are two
channels through which output increases with improvements in institutions (fall in z).
Firstly, there is a compositional effect where as z falls (institutions improve), more
of risky projects are undertaken and fewer safe projects are operated. Secondly,
the risky projects’ output, which is the project output net of resources spent on
monitoring, also increases as z falls as less resources are needed to be spent on
monitoring.
Returning to net outflows as a percentage of output (Appendix A Figures 14(a)
and 14(b)), the non-monotonicity of the outflows in institutional quality is seen with
the higher value of σ only (σ = 0.7). the model is able to replicate the stylized
facts presented in Figure 1 of Appendix A: all indices seem to have a non-linear
relationship with net bank flows except for voice & accountability and the relationship
is somewhat U-shaped. The non-monotonicity in Figure 14(b) is the result of the
relative magnitude of decrease in capital outflows and output when institutions are
poor (higher z). For extreme values of z the model with endogenous labour and
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σ = 0.7 predicts a higher ratio of outflow to output. In summary, even though the
results are robust when it comes to net capital outflows, they are confounding for
net capital outflows as a percentage of output. The results indicate that a thorough
empirical study is needed to shed more light on the issue.
Recall that in an exogenous monitoring setting the intermediary can only adjust
the total amount of intermediated funds φtbt and the cut-off productivity level θˆt, but
not the unit monitoring cost by adjusting lf,t. Recall also that the model is a small
open economy and thus subject to the world interest rate. To better understand the
rationale, we rewrite equation (32) again for the exogenous monitoring cost setting:
(θˆt −
θˆ2t
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t l
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t ) (42)
where, Mt = z
and, θˆtAtk
ak
t l
al
t,e = bt(1 + r
e
t ).
Equation (42) is similar to the zero-profit condition for the financial intermediary
under the endogenous case (Equation 41) and implies that the sum of the repay-
ment collected from non-bankrupt projects and the liquidated output collected from
bankrupt projects equals the resources spent on monitoring the liquidated projects,
as well as the interest rate paid to depositors. However, unlike equation (41) for the
endogenous case, here the intermediary cannot adjust the unit monitoring cost Mt.
As a result, when z increases, smaller loans are issued (bt falls), more projects are
funded (φt increases), while the cut-off productivity level θˆt falls. The fall in θˆt results
in an increase in the expected profits from risky projects for the entrepreneurs15. The
15The lenders have to give the entrepreneurs a higher return (incentive) so that they will not lie,
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fall in bt dominates the increase in φt, total loan φtbt falls. In addition, the fall in
the domestic deposit dt is smaller than the fall in φtbt. Net capital outflow dt − φtbt
increases, in contrast to the endogenous case.
It is worth mentioning that in the closed economy case, dt = φtbt, changes to z are
offset by changes to the deposit interest rate rdt as the wedge between the supply and
demand for loans cannot be filled with international flows. Our numerical exercises
for this particular case resulted in very high loan interest rates. In a closed economy,
the higher monitoring costs can result in a shortage of loanable funds (see Alessandria
and Qian, 2005) and higher interest rates. The endogenous labour supply for the
monitoring technology, when the economy is closed, allows the financial intermediary
to respond to the exogenous changes in the institutional quality by adjusting the
labour input and the monitoring unit cost in turn. Once the economy opens to the
world however the supply can adjust through inflows of international loans.
I will close this section with a few important comments. Firstly, the model with
endogenous labour input to monitoring provides richer comparative statics results
which once exploited can reveal a more complete working mechanism of the financial
intermediary. The benefits of disaggregating the effects of monitoring technology of
financial intermediaries and the general institutional qualities emerge when the model
is applied to studying capital mobility. Secondly, not only does this model produce
results consistent with observations of loan interest rate patterns, it also provides a
simple theoretical framework which can be used to explain empirical findings on the
links between institutions and financial intermediaries.
allowing the lenders to economize on the monitoring cost.
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5 Conclusion
I have modified a costly state verification model to allow for the financial interme-
diary to adjust its monitoring intensity optimally in two dimensions: through the
productivity cut-off level for bankruptcy (θˆt), and labour input into the monitoring
technology (lf,t). It is important to endogenize the labour input into the monitoring
cost if the model is to explain the interaction between the quality of institutions and
finance-related technologies and the net effect on international capital mobility. The
exogenous model’s primary handicap is in the loan interest rate predictions, where
the interest rate spread is decreasing in quality of institutions; a prediction which
cannot be backed by the empirical literature.
Numerical exercises show that including labour input to monitoring technology
in fact matters as it yields a loan interest rate profile which is increasing as quality
of institutions worsen (compared to a decreasing one predicted by the exogenous
model). Furthermore, in response to improvements in monitoring technologies and
quality of general institutions, the models predict significantly different outcomes
in terms of the direction of the international capital flows. The endogenous model
predicts a lowering outflow of capital as the quality of the institutions worsens,
while the exogenous model produces an increasing outflow. The explanation lies
in the added dimension in which the intermediary can economize on monitoring:
adjusting marginal monitoring cost. Traditionally within the literature the marginal
monitoring cost is assumed exogenous and so the financial intermediary can only
adjust through lowering or raising the monitoring intensity.
Since projects last for one period and there is no dynamic decision making by
52
the entrepreneur, the results here do not display any long-term dynamics. Short
versus long term flows distinctions is thus an important future extension of the
model. Addition of a sensitivity analysis and calibration of the numerical results
are also indispensable in order to be able to make predictions with more confidence
and validate the current theoretical findings using real world data. Finally, the
assumption of a perfectly competitive market within the financial intermediation
sector and devoid of any government control will not be in line with the reality
of many developing and less-developed countries. It is of importance to verify the
robustness of these results against an alternative market structure.
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Chapter Three: An Empirical Investigation of Bank
Flows
1 Introduction
General institutions in a country play a significant role in economic development and
efficient resource allocation. Factors such as regulatory quality, degree of accountabil-
ity, political stability, control of corruption, and confidence in the rule of law that
characterize a country’s institutions, are of importance in everyday economic ac-
tivities. This fact has been well established within the growth literature (see for
example Glaeser et al. 2004 and Klein 2005), within trade (Levchenko 2004) and in
the context of bank flows (Ju and Wei, 2006; Papaioannou, 2009). The differences
between the characteristics of institutions in various countries are still ignored in a
large body of growth literature (and in almost all other fields of economic research
where institutions are taken to be a single exogenous force and the models do not
differentiate amongst the types of institutions), leading to partial accounts of forces
behind capital flow patterns and magnitudes.
This paper aims to bring attention to the importance of the institutional quality
for bank flows while underlining the differences between the quality of institutions
and their impacts on bank flows across countries. The methodology is as follows.
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The quality of the financial sector is assessed in terms of the following institutional
variables: voice & accountability, political stability, rule of law, government effec-
tiveness, control of corruption, and regulatory quality. Net bank flows are defined
as the inflows net of outflows and expressed as a percentage of GDP. The empirical
results are obtained from the data covering the period 1998-2008 and using a panel
of 56 rich and middle-income countries. We use the random effects model that rep-
resents the net bank flows as a function of institution variables and select lagged
control variables. The results of the estimation on the full sample reveal that only
the level of political stability in the economy is of importance amongst all institu-
tional variables. However, when income levels are taken into account, rule of law and
voice & accountability matter for rich countries, and political stability is no longer
significant. Furthermore, for mid-income countries, government effectiveness, rule of
law, and voice & accountability matter most, though not the same as they would for
rich economies. Improvement in rule of law is negatively associated with inflows for
rich countries while it is positively associated with inflows for mid-income countries.
Finally, improvements in quality of governance reduces net inflows of bank loans for
mid-income countries and improvements in control of corruption increase inflows for
rich economies.
A typical mechanism which links institutions to capital flows is the financial in-
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termediation. Financial intermediaries, trusted with the task of taking deposits from
consumers and issuing loans to entrepreneurs, monitor loans and enforce financial
contracts. The intermediation process will use up resources such as labour, capital,
public institutions (rule of law, regulatory quality, etc.), which results in a wedge be-
tween the safe saving interest rate paid to the depositors and the risky loan interest
rate collected from the entrepreneurs. This wedge, or the interest rate spread, is
often viewed as a measure of the financial sector’s efficiency. As an example, in insti-
tutions of poor quality one expects to see deficient contract enforcements and more
corruption, which hinders lending conditions. As a result, lending interest rate rises
to compensate for default risks, increasing the interest rate spread in turn. Then,
loan makers look abroad for investment opportunities as the domestic conditions are
now inferior, and the outcome is a net bank loan outflow. The dilemma is then
whether political instability has the same effect on the market as the weakness of
the rule of law. One would expect not and that is what this paper aims to address.
Another mechanism that links institutional quality to capital flows originates
from the substitutability nature of foreign direct investments and financial capital
investments, accounts of which are discussed in Wei and Wu’s (2001) study of sources
of currency crisis, Ju and Wei’s (2006) resolve of the Lucas paradox, and in Wei
and Ju’s (2011) study of a variation of the classical dichotomy. Their conclusion is
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that countries with poor and inefficient financial systems will experience inflows of
FDI and outflows of financial capital (bank loans, portfolio, etc.). Countries with
high levels of corruption receive less FDI, since this form of investment is heavily
dependent on contract enforcement and absence of expropriation, and instead are
net recipients of financial capital. Financial capital flows from countries with poor
institutions to countries with good institutions. Though very important, this paper
does not explore this issue and focuses on bank flows solely.
In related work, Papaioannou (2009) uses a gravity model applied to quarterly
bank flow data between 1977 and 2002 for 140 countries and finds that, despite pop-
ular sentiment, institutional quality is a more important determinant for bank flows
than income. In other words, banks invest more in countries with less corruption: a
one percent increase in the quality of institutions is associated with a two percent
increase in bank lending. This chapter finds that political stability is a significant
explanatory force when looking at the full sample of all countries simultaneously, yet
when the sample is broken down by income groups, different patterns emerge and
other institutional quality measures come out as significant as the control of cor-
ruption. For example, while the degree of rule of law is equally important for both
rich and mid-income countries, improvements in this respect attract more inflows
in rich countries while causing more outflows in mid-income countries. The esti-
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mation results show that improvements in government effectiveness only matter for
mid-income countries and do not seem to affect the flows to and from rich countries.
In other work, Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias (2000) find a positive and signif-
icant relationship between the perceived risk of a country and the total FDI inflows
into that country using an averaged (1996-98) cross-section data. Wei and Wu (2001)
also links institutional quality with financial flows, indirectly, by demonstrating that
countries with corrupt institutions favour less FDI and experience a portfolio shift
to loans instead. As far as other covariates are concerned, Berkel (2004) investigates
the home equity bias and finds capital control measures to be insignificant when con-
trolling for the degree of financial market developments, strength of the legal system
and other information asymmetries. Furthermore, bank structure (concentration)
and regulation have been shown to be unimportant when controlling for broader
institutional measures (Demirguc-Kunt, Levine and Laeven; 2004). Herrmann and
Mihaljek (2010) use a gravity model as well and find that in general bank flows are
downhill, from rich to poor countries. Faria and Mauro (2009) explore the association
between finance and quality of institutions from a risk-sharing point of view. Using
a cross-section of 55 countries the authors find that weak institutions encourage a
shift in portfolio to more crisis-prone forms of capital flows. In general, countries
with more developed general institutions can better reap the benefits of financial
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liberalization (Chinn and Ito; 2006). Sustaining sound institutions is also a condi-
tion for a well-developed financial market (La Porta et al.; 1998). A well-developed
financial market in turn increases a country’s absorptive capacity (Prasad, Rajan
and Subramanian; 2006) of foreign finance and enhances growth.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a set of stylized facts
and summary of patterns in flows and institutional quality indices across countries.
Section 3 presents a description of the data. In Section 4, the empirical model is
discussed. The results are presented in Section 5, followed by the conclusions in
Section 6.
2 Stylized Facts
Changes in net bank flows over time (calculated as the outflows subtracted from
inflows16, and expressed as a percentage of the GDP) and gross bank flows (sum of
absolute values of inflows and outflows, also expressed as a percentage of the GDP)
are presented in Figure 17 of Appendix A. Net and gross FDI are also plotted for
comparison (defined, just as described above for bank flows, as a percentage of the
GDP). While net FDI expressed as a percentage of GDP is on average larger than
net bank flows, gross bank flows on average exceed gross FDI flows. In the top panel
16A positive net bank flow is an indication of inflow of loans
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of Figure 17 of Appendix A, we observe that the net bank flows are exceptionally
high in 2009. That year is an anomaly given the events surrounding the financial
meltdown in late 2008 and is thus excluded from the final estimation using net bank
flows. The sudden changes observed in 2008 and 2009 net bank flow values are
explained in Herrmann and Mihaljek (2010) who find that the increase in global
risk aversion and expected financial market volatility both reduce the flow of bank
flows. Interesting patterns emerge when looking at the cross-section of flows by
country income group and by region. Breaking down the flows by country income
group17 (Appendix A Figure 18) reveals that while low income and lower mid-income
countries are net borrowers, high-income OECD, upper mid-income and high income
countries are net exporters of bank loans. High-income countries (both OECD and
non-OECD) stand out in terms of gross bank flows, perhaps due to the existence of
better developed financial markets in these economies. As expected, OECD member
countries are net importers of direct investment as FDI flows to countries with sound
institutions and less corruption.
From the classification by geographical regions in Figure 19 of Appendix A, it
becomes clear that European and Middle Eastern countries are the primary suppliers
of bank loans18. The former’s large outflow is most likely driven by the EU coun-
17World Bank Classification: low income, $1,025 or less; lower middle income, $1,026 - $4,035;
upper middle income, $4,036 - $12,475; and high income, $12,476 or more.
18Central America gross bank flow data are hugely inflated because of the Bahamas.
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tries’ significant exposure to high growth emerging economies19. Middle Eastern and
Northern African regions are dominated by oil producing economies. These countries
direct their excess oil revenues to investment banks or regular deposit taking insti-
tutions, while these institutions in turn invest the proceedings in emerging markets
or in other specific external projects (Wiegand, 2008).
The institutional variables broken down by country income group are depicted in
Figure 20 of Appendix A. The richer countries score higher on all six institutional
quality indices. We observe that interesting patterns emerge when the indices are
divided with respect to geographic region (Appendix A: Figure 21). North Amer-
ica and Europe enjoy the highest institutional quality, while Sub-Saharan Africa as
well as the Middle East and North Africa regions have the poorest institutions in
place. The Middle East and North Africa are comprised of economies dominated
by political instability and lack of accountability (particularly in the Middle East).
South America and East Central Asia are very similar in this respect. South America
scores higher on accountability perhaps because of the higher number of democracies
compared to the East and Central Asia region. However, South America scores lower
in rule of law which could be due to high income inequality prevalent in the region.
19See Herrmann and Mihaljek (2010)
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3 Data
This section presents the data set used in the empirical study. The entire data set
covers 177 countries between 1998 and 2009. However, the estimation is only per-
formed on 56 of the countries (26 rich and 30 mid-income countries)20. The countries
excluded from the sample are the low-income countries due to a high number of miss-
ing observations. The data consists of observations on the bank flow variables, the
institutional variables, and selected macroeconomic fundamentals. Each of the three
sets of variables is defined in the following subsections and the summary statistics
are presented in Table 5 in the Appendix B section.
3.1 Capital Flow Data
Bank loan data in line 1 of Table 5 of Appendix B are extracted from IMF’s 2010
International Financial Statistics Yearbook. Lines 78bqd (assets) and 78bud (lia-
bilities) are added in absolute value to form the gross bank loan flows variable. To
get the net flows, assets and liabilities are added since debits are marked with a
minus sign. The reported values correspond to transactions involving trade cred-
its, deposits, bonds and currency that are facilitated by the banking system. These
values are converted into domestic currency by using the International Financial
20Country lists can be found in Table 14 of Appendix B section
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Statistics ’ National Currency per U.S. Dollar exchange rate data averaged over the
sampling period and divided by the nominal GDP (in domestic currency), extracted
from International Monetary Fund ’s World Economic Outlook database. Net For-
eign Direct Investment data are constructed by adding lines 78bdd and 78bed of the
same data source. Table 5, Appendix B reports the overall, between and within
variations for each variable of interest. The overall variation of each variable is de-
composed into a between x¯i (across countries) and within x¯t (within each country)
variation21. In Table 5, Appendix B, n is the number of panels for each variable, T
is the average number of years observations are available for within each panel, and
the total number of observations for each variable is T ×n = N . In the final estima-
tion of each model the total number of observations will vary since the panels need
to be balanced for the estimation to be viable. While the variation over time and
the variation across countries are the same for net FDI flows, the net bank inflows
exhibit a different pattern. Variations over time in net bank inflows are more than
twice the variations across countries. As shown by Albuquerque (2003) FDI flows
are less volatile compared to other forms of capital flows since they are less likely
to be expropriated and hence can serve as a risk-sharing instrument. Finally, net
bank inflows seem to be more volatile over time, as is generally understood in the
literature (Wei and Wu, 2001), given that the standard deviation over time is 15%
21Within variation refers to the deviation from each country’s average.
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higher than the standard deviation of the FDI flows across countries.
It is noteworthy that gross capital flows are used in the literature instead of
net in order to study the risk associated with such flows to the economy, such as
domestic credit booms and sudden capital reversals22. Gross flows do not reveal
the underlying patterns of inflows and outflows and leave out the credit needs of an
economy. Therefore, it is unclear if the economy is a net exporter of funds or not,
and if so, what are the underlying factors. We are interested in finding out what
contributing factors can make an economy a net lender or a net borrower of bank
loans.
3.2 Institutional Quality Indices
The data on a total of 6 institutional quality indices are compiled by the World Bank
and documented by Kaufmann et al. (2010), titled as The Worldwide Governance
Indicators (1996-2010) and summarized in rows 3-8 of Table 5 in Appendix B. There
are six aggregate indicators which are compiled using over 30 underlying data sources
“reporting the perceptions of governance of a large number of survey respondents and
expert assessments worldwide”. The values of these variables range from 0 to 5, with
the value being close to 5 when institutions are deemed well-functioning23. Rows
22see Shin (2012) for an example
23In the original data set, the values range between -2.5 to 2.5, but to simplify the interpretation
of the estimation results, the values are transformed to a range between 0 and 5.
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3-8 of Table 5 in Appendix B Section reveal that the variations across countries are
greater than the variations across time. One possible explanation is that institutional
changes within a country and their effects take years to be realized, while institutional
quality indices vary greatly across countries. The definitions of the institutional
quality indices are presented as follows.
• Voice and Accountability 24 Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a coun-
try’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.
• political stability : Reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the government
will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, in-
cluding politically-motivated violence and terrorism.
• government effectiveness : Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services,
the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from polit-
ical pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the
credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.
• regulatory quality : Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to for-
mulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote
private sector development.
24All variable definitions are directly from Kaufmann et al. (2010)
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• rule of law : Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence
in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood
of crime and violence.
• control of corruption: Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power
is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corrup-
tion, as well as ”capture” of the state by elites and private interests.
The only other source of institutional quality data is the Political Risk Services
Group’s International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset. The World Bank data
is used in this study due to ease of access.
3.3 Control Variables
The stocks traded, Treasury bill rate, exchange rate, and degree of openness to trade
are extracted from the World Bank’s database and their summary statistics are given
in rows 9-12 of Table 5 of Appendix B. Exchange rate volatility is the growth rate
of local currency per US dollar, computed as an annual average. Stocks traded is
the total value of stocks traded, calculated as a ratio of GDP, and measures the
degree of market liquidity. The data on the Treasury rate, and the economy’s degree
of openness are extracted from the IMF’s IFS 2010 Yearbook. The Treasury bill
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interest rate is the government bond yield (line 61) per annum which is the yield
to maturity of government bonds (or other bonds that would indicate longer term
rates). The degree of openness is the ratio of sum of exports (line 78aad) and imports
(line 78abd in absolute value) as a ratio of GDP. This is the standard measure in
the literature to assess how open a country is to the rest of the world economically.
4 Empirical Model
The standard model used in the empirical literature of international trade flows is the
gravity model (see Bergstrand’s (1985) seminal paper). Portes and Rey (2005) show
that the same gravity model also fits the gross international equity flow data almost
as well as the international trade data. There is a caveat in using the gravity model
for bank loan flow data however. In general, there is a lack of a supporting theoretical
foundation for applying the gravity model to financial capital flows (see Siregar et al.
(2010) for a detailed discussion). While attempts have been made by Helpman (1987)
and Anderson et al. (2004) to alleviate this problem within the trade literature,
the same cannot be said about the bank loan flow literature. In addition, a core
component of the gravity model is the population size. However, while population is
deemed to be an important factor in trade data (larger population inducing a larger
consumption market for example), it is not very clear why it should be significant for
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the bank loan flow data. The ambiguity in using population as a gravitational force
is underlined by the inconsistency in sign and statistical significance often observed
in the trade empirical literature.
Bank loans are different in nature to goods and services since loans generally are
diverted to countries where higher returns are guaranteed while goods and services
are traded, depending on comparative advantage. Higher loan interest rates how-
ever need not be a result of competitive advantage and may only be reflective of the
structure of the banking sector, regulations, higher inflation or soaring growth rates.
Of course, one could look at the financial intermediaries themselves as a source of
comparative advantage (Ju and Wei, 2011) given that financial development across
countries is found to be highly asymmetrical. With goods and services, market size is
often leveraged on the demand side, while productivity and comparative advantage
are pertinent to the supply side. The second sharp difference between trade flows
and bank loan flows has to do with distance and country size. While distance is un-
derstandably a significant parameter25 capturing primarily transportation costs in a
model of trade, for financial capital there are no transportation costs to be captured.
In a world with decreasing transaction costs and information technology advance-
ment, it may prove difficult to justify the role of distance in flow of financial capital.
25Distance in gravity models should have a diminishing effect over time and this is a major crit-
icism of such models. See Brun, Carrere, Guillaumont, and de Melo (2005) for potential remedies.
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It has been shown that distance is a much more important factor for determining
FDI, for example, than for portfolio investments. Instead, country size is an issue
that must be looked at more closely. Countries like Luxembourg, the Bahamas and
Iceland are not particularly large, yet when it comes to international bank flows,
they are among some of the major participants in the world markets.
Therefore, instead of the gravity model, used by Portes and Rey (2005) for exam-
ple, our empirical model is based on the theoretical work of Ju and Wei (2010, 2011)
and Mutsuyama (2008) presented in Chapter 2, where capital is shown to flow out
of the countries with poor institutions. In general, countries with poor institutions
fail to properly enforce contracts, i.e. the rule of law, and often tend to impose reg-
ulations detrimental to productive financial intermediation. The counter-productive
nature of these institutions causes less funding for domestic projects and encourages
a surge in capital outflows in search of better returns. Bank flows are, however,
very sensitive to changes to level of development of the stock market, trends in the
exchange rate market, or changes to the treasury bill rates. As such, to accurately
estimate the effect of institutions, the model must also account for such economic
fundamentals.
We use the one-way country-specific random effect model in order to model the
inflows and outflows simultaneously and to account for the unobserved heterogeneity
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(Greene, 2011):
yit = α + φ
′Xit + γ
′Zit−1 + uit (43)
uit = λi + ǫit
t = 1 . . . T, i = 1 . . . N.
In the above specification, yit is the net bank loan inflows expressed as a percentage
of the GDP for country i in year t, Xit is the matrix containing the six institutional
quality variables, φ is the vector of coefficients associated with the institutional qual-
ity variables, Zit−1 is the matrix containing the four lagged control variables, α is
the intercept term, γ is the vector of coefficients associated with the control vari-
ables, and uit is error structure. Finally, the two-part error structure consists of
λi, which is the unobserved heterogeneity (individual-specific effect), and ǫit, which
is the idiosyncratic error term, where E[ǫit|Xit, Zit] = E[λi|Xit, Zit−1] = 0. The
individual-specific effect is a random variable uncorrelated with the explanatory vari-
ables at all lags/leads and has a finite variance (σ2λ,i). The model is identifiable since
rank(Ψi,t) < n × T , where n = 56, T=10, and Ψi,t = [1 Xit Zit]. The cross-section
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units (countries) are denoted by i = 1 . . . n = 56 while t = 1 . . . T = 10 denotes
the years from 1998 to 2008. We use specification tests to confirm the choice of the
random effect model in Section 4 and use the lags of the control variables in order
to avoid the potential endogeneity problems.
In the literature, the institutional variables are generally expected to have a si-
multaneous and negative effect on capital flows since better institutions are expected
to result in more efficient allocation of resources domestically and thus cause a net
outflow of financial capital. At the same time, one can argue that poor countries
may struggle with finding investment and lending opportunities domestically and
will export the excess capital abroad. By including different types of institutional
measures one can examine to see of the associations between bank flows and in-
stitutional measures, which are consistent across different income groups, and that
which effects matter the most. The control variables are lagged in light of a causal
identification problem. Changes in institutions may affect the control variables si-
multaneously and thus replacing Zi,t with Zi,t−1 solves the problem of Zi,t being
endogenous to Yi,t. Furthermore, changes in the exchange rate, Treasury bill rate,
or degree of openness to trade may all impact bank flows with some lag. As such,
I estimated model (43) without lagged control variables first and then with lagged
control variables to find only the lagged variables to be statistically significant.
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The first control variable is the value of stocks traded as a percentage of GDP, a
proxy for the level of development of the financial markets in an economy. The better
developed the stock market, the more likely it is for financial intermediaries to raise
equity from the market as opposed to look abroad for funds. Stulz et al. (2013) for
example show that capital flows into countries where there is improvement in local
market liquidity. Finally, a liquidity shock may result in sudden reversals of foreign
flows (Kirabaeva and Razin, 2010) as foreign investors recalibrate their portfolios and
move funds to less-risky investment projects. Treasury bill interest rates are higher
during poor economic conditions as a result of the governments’ efforts to stabilize
the financial climate and to improve domestic lending conditions. If the domestic
economy is destabilized, domestic lending decreases and capital is expected to flow
out.
The lagged rate of change in exchange rate per US dollar (lagged one period)
captures the volatility and sudden shifts in the exchange rate. Temporary exchange
rate depreciation makes domestic returns more appealing to incoming investors as the
funds cost less now taking into consideration the exchange rate. Capital inflows are
documented to induce exchange rate appreciation26 (see Combes, Kinda and Plane,
2011), however the short-term positive correlation cannot be interpreted as a causal
26It must be noted that FDI type of flows are exempt from this pattern (Brooks et al., 2001, and
Kamar et al., 2010)
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relationship. Factors such as high inflation, speculation and large current account
surpluses may also cause exchange rate appreciation. Investors looking to lend their
funds abroad will take into account these factors and will likely avoid investing in
countries with expected exchange rate appreciation.
The last covariate in model (43) is a lagged measure of economic openness. The
standard measure in the literature is the sum of absolute values of imports and
exports calculated as a percentage of the GDP. Flows of different capital types depend
on a country’s willingness to engage in economic activity with the rest of the world.
The general convention is that richer countries are exporters of financial capital and
these are countries which are more open to interaction with the rest of the world. We
can estimate this association to see whether this control variable is significant for the
mid-income countries as well and whether the sign is indeed negative (indicating that
these countries are net exporters of bank loans). More open economies will enjoy a
larger ratio of flows and the GDP perhaps, but whether more openness results in net
inflows or outflows remains to be confirmed by the regression results.
5 Estimation
We use the FGLS estimator and estimate Equation (43) for samples of middle-
income (N1 = 30), rich (N2 = 26), and all countries (N = 56), which are reported
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in separate columns of Table 9 of Appendix B. This approach is based on a two-step
estimation in which a pooled model is first estimated and the resulting residuals
are next used to construct an unrestricted error covariance matrix for the second
step. The FGLS estimator is consistent and asymptotically normally distributed
when N → ∞ even if T is fixed. Furthermore, the data are transformed using
the PraisWinsten transformation so that the resulting estimates are robust to serial
correlation as well as to any intra panel heteroskedasticity27 (provided that there is
no group-wise heteroskedasticity present).
We also estimate using the FGLS estimator an extended version of model 43 that
captures the non-linearity in the institutional variables (Table 10 in the Appendix B
section). That is, the quadratic terms which are statistically significant in each of the
3 samples, such as the rule of law, political stability, accountability and control of cor-
ruption. Squaring the institutional indices also alleviates any collinearity problems
as correlation is a linear association and including the quadratic terms breaks that
linear relationship. An important problem in panel data modelling is endogeneity. In
order to determine whether model (43) is well-specified we perform the specification
test by Hausman (1978) for endogeneity. Given that the estimate of the fixed-effect
model is consistent in the presence of endogeneity, the test for endogeneity is equiv-
alent to testing for random-effects against fixed-effects. Accordingly, the Hausman
27Greene (2003, p.322), Wooldridge (2002, p.263)
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test statistic is the squared value of the difference measure between the fixed effects
and the random effects estimates divided by the difference of the covariance matrices
of the two models. Under the null H0 : cov(Ψit, λi) = 0, ∀i, t, the test is chi-square
distributed with degrees of freedom equal to the rank of the matrix of the difference
between the two estimated covariance matrices. The results of this test are reported
in Table 6 of Appendix B. The test does not reject H0 in the three samples. We take
this as evidence in favour of the random effects model.
The second specification test is the Breusch-Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier
(LM) test for heterogeneity, which is used to test for the presence of random effects
against the pooled regression with equal error variances. Under the null hypothesis
of a pooled regression model, the test statistic is chi-square distributed with 1 degree
of freedom. Table 7 of Appendix B displays the results of the LM test for the each
of the three samples. The null is rejected across all three samples which provide
evidence in favour of the random effects model.
6 Goodness of Fit Tests
The overall R2 for each estimation is reported in the corresponding tables in Ap-
pendix B. While the R2 values are not directly comparable due to different degrees
of freedom, the choice of running separate regressions for each income group is jus-
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tified by looking at the R2 values of each estimated model where the regressions for
All Countries all have lower R2 values. At the same time, comparing the values
within the Rich and Mid-income samples across Table 10 of Appendix B, we observe
a marked improvement in the R2 values. We observe even a bigger improvement in
the Overall R2 with the quadratic model (Table 10 of Appendix B). Finally, the sep-
arate inflow/outflow regression estimates reported in Tables 12 and 13 of Appendix
B have lower R2 values compared to the ones reported in Table 10 indicating that
joint modelling of net flows is advantageous over modelling of inflows and outflows
separately.
We test the joint significance of the quadratic terms using the residual sum of
squares for the model estimates reported in Table 10 as the unrestricted model and
the model estimates reported in Table 9 as the restricted model. The null hypothesis
is therefore H0 : inst
2
1 = · · · = inst
2
6 = 0 where inst1 to inst6 are the 6 institutional
variables of regulatory quality, government effectiveness, rule of law, voice & account-
ability, political stability, and control of corruption. The chi-square test statistic is
equal to 14.548 with 6 degrees of freedom. The reported p-value is 0.0241 which is
an indication that we can safely reject the null and claim that the quadratic terms
are jointly statistically significant.
To test for the presence of autocorrelation in the residuals, we employ the La-
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grange Multiplier (LM) test developed by Breusch (1978) and Godfrey (1978). We
apply this test to the quadratic model given in Table 10 and report the results in
Table 8 of Appendix B. We fail to reject the null hypothesis of zero serial-correlation
for the model estimated on the middle-income sample only. It would be interesting
to conduct further tests to see if the outcomes of the LM test applied to the middle-
income sample is due to non-stationarity in the data using the proposed method
by Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003). The Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) test is generally preferred
over the Maddala-Wu test (1999) (Baltagi and Kao, 2000) since it accounts for cross-
section independence, i.e. the correlation across countries. However, these tests are
known to suffer from size distortion for small time series (T = 10 in this case) as
shown by Karlsson and Lothgren(2000) and Hlouskova and Wagner (2006). In par-
ticular, the Im-Pesaran-Shin test will be oversized for small T . Lastly, all these tests
have computational issues when applied to an unbalanced sample.
7 The Results
Model (43) with quadratic terms is estimated using three samples of all countries,
rich countries, and mid-income countries. There are N1 = 26, N2 = 30, and N = 56
countries respectively in each sample. The estimation results for the quadratic model
presented in Table 10 of Appendix B reveal that in the sample of the mid-income and
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the rich countries, the only institutional variable which is significant is the political
stability index. This finding is in line with the findings in Papaioannou (2009) where
political stability is highly significant. When the sample is divided into the rich and
mid-income countries however, political stability is no longer significant. Both rule
of law and voice & accountability are the only institutional variables which are highly
significant across the rich and mid-income samples. Neither however is significant
in the whole sample. For mid-income countries, government effectiveness is also a
significant explanatory variable, while for rich countries control of corruption is also
statistically significant.
Improvements in the rule of law seem to result in an increase of outflows of loans
for rich countries and an inflow of loans for the mid-income countries. To understand
this finding better, we look at contract enforcement as one component of the rule of
law for example. It is widely accepted that contracts are better enforced in developed
countries. As such, loan contracts are either fulfilled or in case of default the lender is
able to recover a higher percentage of the loan. The security in contract enforcement
encourages lending and allows for a more efficient allocation of funds. This makes a
mid-income country a safer lending target: for developing countries with relatively
lower quality of contract enforcement lending out to these developed economies is a
safer investment.
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In order to assess the impact of each significant variable on net bank flows, we
calculate the effect of one standard deviation deviations from the means of each of the
significant institutional variables on net bank flows (see Table 11 of the Appendix B
section). For a richer economy, a one standard deviation improvement in the quality
of rule of law decreases imports of bank loans by 2.89 percentage points, while for
mid-income countries it will result in an increase of 0.804 percentage points increase
in exports of bank loans. Voice & accountability seems to have a similar effect on
bank flows, decreasing outflows by 0.717 and 1.323 percentage points for the mid-
income and rich countries respectively. For the mid-income countries, a one standard
deviation improvement in government effectiveness results in an increase of outflows
by 0.864 percentage points. Better control of corruption for the richer economies
seems to decrease exports of bank loans by 1.409 percentage points. For the whole
sample however, the improvements in political stability measures do not seem to have
much impact (-0.008 percentage point decrease).
Figures 22-25 of Appendix A display the marginal effects calculated as change
in net bank flows (%) and plotted against the institutional quality measures. The
marginal effects for the full sample of all countries is presented in Figure 22 of
Appendix A where better political stability is associated with higher inflows of bank
loans. The marginal effects for the rule of law (Figure 23 of Appendix A), show
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the difference of the impact of this index on bank flows amongst the rich and mid-
income countries. Mid-income countries can expect higher levels of net inflows as a
result of improvements to the rule of law, while the rich will most likely experience
increases in net outflows. Voice & accountability tend to behave the same for both
income groups (Figure 24 of Appendix A), though, for the mid-income countries
there seems to be less sensitivity of bank flows to improvements in this index relative
to the rich countries. Figure 25a of Appendix A documents the association between
better institutions and the decreasing bank inflows for mid-income countries. Finally,
Figure 25b of Appendix A shows how richer countries tend to experience higher levels
of inflows with better institutional quality.
The reasons behind the differences in directions of flows in bank loans resulting
from improvements in these institutional variables at first glance could be understood
within the context of differences in growth stages between economies. Aisen and
Veiga (2011) find a negative association between political stability and economic
growth for example. Political stability has for long been achieved in most advanced
economies and so one expects less variation in the index for developed economies
compared to developing and least-developed economies28. Hence, there is a possibility
that the effect of the less-developed countries is dominating here in the sense that
28The standard deviation for rich countries is 0.6971 compared to 0.7332 for the mid-income
countries
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these countries are in early phases of growth and require capital to fund domestic
investments. Once a politically stable government is in place, its effectiveness and
ability to enforce the rule of law start to improve and these attributes become relevant
to investors.
As presented in Table 10 of Appendix B, the four control variables all have the
same sign across all models though all are not necessarily significant consistently
across models. For rich countries, a one percent increase in the exchange rate is
followed by a 0.01% decrease in net inflows. Higher exchange rate make domestic
investment returns less appealing to foreign investors. Similarly, a 1% increase in
stocks traded (total value, % of GDP) results in a net inflow decrease of 0.005%. The
more liquidity available and the better-functioning the stock market in a country, the
greater is the wealth effect for the financial intermediaries, and the more the banks
look outward to lend out. Furthermore, inflows to these countries may be decreasing
because of the crowding out effect that a well-functioning stock market has for the
financial intermediary lending market. For mid-income countries, the Treasury bill
rate increase results in a decrease in net inflows by 0.011 percentage points. Higher
treasury rates induce banks to lend to the government mostly and this limit funding
to domestic investment opportunities.
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7.1 Alternative Model
Tables 12 and 13 of Appendix B present the results from estimating two separate
regressions of inflows and outflows in order to see if the institutional variables have
different effects on each of the flow variables separately. Model (43) without unob-
served heterogeneity reduces to a SUR (seemingly unrelated) model when the same
set of covariates is used. As such, we can estimate the two equations individually
using the FGLS to give a clearer picture on the relationship between the institutional
quality measures and the bank flows. The interpretation of these results is compli-
cated since both equations have the same set of covariates, and since we are not
able to differentiate between source and host country characteristics. In the entire
sample, institutional indices are significant explanatory variables for inflows mostly
and not so much for the outflows. In other words, host countries characteristics tend
to matter more for flows as opposed to the source countries. Furthermore, the inflows
series and the outflows series are highly negatively correlated (ρ = −0.9779) overall.
On a year to year basis, the correlation values range from ρ = 0.9967 to ρ = 0.9490,
with all correlation values statistically significant at the 99% level.
Nevertheless, interesting patterns emerge from the estimation results which may
shed more light on the earlier results. While institutional factors are only relevant for
inflows of mid-income countries, they seem to matter for outflows of both the rich and
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the mid-income countries. Political stability which was the only significant variable
for net inflows in the full sample is not seen to be highly significant for outflows
of the three samples (all countries, rich and mid-income countries). Outflows are
increasing with more political stability in the rich countries, while it decreases as
political stability improves for the mid-income economies.
While voice & accountability is significant for net bank flows of both the rich and
mid-income economies, it only seems to affect the outflow of mid-income countries
and not the rich. Lower levels of outflow are associated with improvements in the
voice & accountability measure. Similarly, rule of law was significant for net bank
inflows of rich and mid-income economies, while being an important explanatory
for inflow of mid-income economies, it is highly significant for outflows of both rich
and mid-income economies. Surprisingly both inflows and outflows are decreasing in
the rule of law. Countries with better contract enforcements tend to experience less
in- and outflow of bank loans. This could be due to a better risk assessment and
management capacity of the financial intermediaries in these countries which results
in a more efficient allocation of loans and thus a lesser need for external funds or
external borrowing.
A variable of interest which is often cited in theoretical literature on financial
intermediation and financial capital flows as the exogenous institutional quality is
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the regulatory quality index. While the index is not significant for net flows, it does
seem to be significant for outflow of rich countries. Recall that the index used in this
paper measures how favourable the regulatory conditions are to doing business in a
country. As the estimates in this section show, the more favourable the regulatory
conditions are, the lower is the level of outflow of bank loans. Capital tends to
generally run away from a poor regulatory environment. As such, it is fully expected
to see a lower outflow from a country with a favourable regulatory environment.
7.2 Further Discussion
In the literature, there exist some papers which investigate the determinants of cross-
border bank flows. Papaioannou (2009), for example, uses one aggregate political
risk measure and finds that it is highly significant and that improvements in this
measure do attract bank flows for recipient countries. Using quarterly data however
introduces additional variability which may not be due to institutional improvements
(which usually have small variation over years) and furthermore, the chapter focuses
on one type of institutional quality. Herrmann and Mihaljek (2010) also look at
the determinant of bank flows but ignore institutional quality factors and are thus
only able to verify that the gravity model explanatory variables are significant in
explaining cross-border bank flows. Furthermore, as is the case with all gravity model
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approaches, their estimation is based on outflows from a group of few rich source
countries to some recipient developing countries only. Jeanneau and Micu (2002)
focus on Asia and Latin America and find that both push and pull factors (macro
conditions in both the source and recipient countries) are significant in explaining
cross-border bank flows. Similarly, Muellera and Uhdeb (2010) find macroeconomic
effects to be significant in explaining bank flows as well as institutional arrangements
such as exchange rate agreements. Their study however also fails to incorporate
differences in institutional quality across countries.
8 Concluding Remarks
This paper uses annual series of institutional quality variables and bank flow data
(expressed as percentage of the GDP) to reveal the impact of different kinds of in-
stitutions across countries. Our results at different income levels indicate that while
improvements in political stability augment bank inflows in the entire sample of all
countries, once the sample is broken down by income group, political stability is no
longer a significant explanatory. Instead, improvements in government effectiveness,
enforcement of the rule of law, voice & accountability and control of corruption be-
come significant depending on the income group of the country. The impacts however
are not always the same. Improvements in the rule of law in richer countries result
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in greater outflows, while in mid-income countries, they result in greater inflows.
One possible explanation for this contradictory outcome may be the nature of these
institutions. Further research is needed to understand the peculiar links between
these institutions and flows in general and why capital flows often do not confirm
the theoretical predictions.
Our empirical model also contains macro control covariates to account for cross-
country differences. These explanatory variables are not all statistically significant
across different income groups. In mid-income countries, the Treasury bill rate seems
to be the only significant explanatory factor, while exchange rate appreciation, the
degree of openness to the world and development of the stock market are signifi-
cant explanatory factors for the rich countries. When looking at the whole sample,
however, we find that all macro controls are relevant except for the exchange rate.
The chapter makes a contribution to the institutional quality and capital flow lit-
erature by exposing different types of institutional quality measures and their effects
on international capital flows. A larger sample would greatly improve the results,
as well as strong instruments to account for any potential endogeneity and any con-
founding effects. Furthermore, controlling for macro characteristics can improve the
robustness and consistency of the estimates. Lastly, controls for specific financial
regulations, such as capital requirements or the Basel Accord requirements, as well
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as the market structure of the financial sector can give better insight on the forces
behind the magnitude and direction of international bank flows.
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Chapter Four: Conclusion
The thesis aims to contribute to the theoretical and empirical literature of cross-
border capital mobility. In particular, focusing on movement of bank loans, a model
of costly-state verification is used to build a theoretical foundation for understanding
the link between the quality of general institutions in the economy and the magnitude
and direction of bank flows between countries. The link is established using the
financial intermediation sector which raises deposits in order to be able to fund
investments domestically. Doing so, I also introduce the new and novel idea of
allowing for endogenous labour input into the monitoring technology of the financial
intermediary as opposed assuming a fixed unit monitoring cost as is common within
the literature.
The introduction of the endogenous labour input produces a loan interest rate
profile in line with what is observed in the data; higher loan rates associated with
poorer institutional quality. Furthermore, the numerical analysis of the theoretical
model show that bank flows are non-monotonic in institutional quality where the
countries with the best and worst institutions tend to have a higher capital outflow
as a ratio of GDP. The model with the endogenous labour input is able to better
match the patterns of bank flows observed in the data.
An empirical investigation accompanies the theoretical work to shed light on
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the types of institutions that matter for magnitude and direction of bank flows.
Using a panel of 56 rich and mid-income countries and 12 years of data (1997-2008)
a quadratic random-effects model is estimated first using a full sample, and then
using sub-samples based on income category. The estimation reveals the following
results. Firstly, rich and mid-income countries show different patterns in terms
of which institutions matter for bank flows and how they matter. While political
stability seems to be the most significant institutional measure for the full sample
of 56 countries of rich and mid-income countries, it no longer is significant when
controlling for income levels. In particular, for rich economies, voice & accountability,
rule of law and control of corruption seem to matter. For mid-income countries, voice
& accountability, and rule of law also matter but also the government effectiveness.
Secondly, while improvements in the rule of law for rich economies seems to encourage
more outflow, for mid-income economies it encourages more inflows of bank loans.
These results are interesting for two reasons. Firstly, they justify distinguishing
between types of institutional quality within the theoretical literature. Secondly,
the same institutions types tend to have different impacts on flows for rich versus
mid-income economies. Further work will be needed to fully explain and understand
these underlying forces and differences.
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1 Appendix A - Figures
Figure 1: Net Bank Outflows vs. Institutional Quality
ALB
AGO
ARGARM ABW AUS
AUT
ZE BHS
BHR
BGD BRBBLR
BEL
BLZBENBMUBIH
BWA
B A
BRNBGR
BFABDIKHM CDN
CPV
C I
HKG
MAC
CHCOL CRCCRO
CYP
CZECIV
DEN
DJI
DOMEGY
ESA
EST
ETH IJ FINFRA
GAB
G O
GER
GUA
GUI
GBSHAI ON
HUN
ISL
INDIN
IRL
ISRITAJAM JPNJO
KAZ
KOR
KOS KUWKGZLA
LAT
LIB
LES
LBA
LTU
LUX
M D MAS
MDV
LI
MLT
M IXD GLARZ
NAM
NCANIG
NGR NOROMAPAK
PAN
PNG
P RPEP I POL PORROU
RUSRWA S MKSASENS
SEY
SIN
SVK SLO
RSA
ESP
SRISU SW SWE
SUI
SYRTJK
THA
T TRITUUUKR UK
USA
URU
V NVENYEM Z
−
2
0
−
1
0
0
1
0
N
e
t 
B
a
n
k
 F
lo
w
s
 (
%
 o
f 
G
D
P
)
1 2 3 4 5
Rule of Law Index
Rule of Law
ALB
AGO
ARGARM ABW AUS
AUT
AZE BHS
BHR
BGD BRBBLR
BEL
BLZBENBMUBIH
BWA
BRA
BRNBGR
FADIKHM CDN
CPV
C I
HKG
MAC
CHNCOL CRCCRO
CYP
CZEC V
DEN
DJI
DOEGY
ESA
EST
ETHFIJ FINFRA
GAB
GEO
GER
GUA
GUI
GBSHAI HON
HUN
ISL
INDIN
IRL
ISRITAJ M JPNJOR
KAZ
KO
KOS KUWK ZLAO
LAT
LIB
LES
LBA
LTU
LUX
M DMAS
MDV
MLI
MLT
MRIEXMDMGL RMOZ
NAM
NCAN
NGR NORMAP K
PAN
PNG
P R PERPHI P L PORROU
USRWASAKSASENS B
SEY
IN
VK SLO
RSA
ESP
RISU SW WE
SUI
SYTJK
THA
T G T ITUU AUKR UK
USA
URU
VAV NYEMZ
−
2
0
−
1
0
0
1
0
1 2 3 4 5
Control of Corruption
Control of Corruption
ALB
AGO
ARGARM ABWAUS
AUT
AZE BHS
BHR
BGD BRBBLR
BEL
BLZBENBMUBIH
BWA
A
BRNBGR
BFABDI KH CDN
CPV
CHI
HKG
MAC
CHNCOL CRCRO
CYP
CZECIV
DE
DJI
DOMEGY
ESA
EST
ETH FIJ FINF A
GAB
GEO
GER
GUA
GUI
G SHAI ON
UN
ISL
INDINA
I L
ISR ITAJA JPNJO
KAZ
KOR
KOSKUWKGZLAO
LAT
LIB
LES
LB
LTU
LUX
M DS
MDV
LI
MLT
MRIEXMDA MGLMOZ
NAM
NCANIG
GR NOROMAPAK
PAN
PNG
PARPERPHI P L PORROU
RUSWA S MKSASENSRB
SEY
SIN
SVSLO
RSA
ESP
SRISUD WZ WE
SUI
SYTJK
THA
TO TRITUUGA U R UK
USA
URU
V NVENYEM Z M
−
2
0
−
1
0
0
1
0
0 1 2 3 4
Political Stability
Political Stability
ALB
AGO
ARGARM ABWAUS
AUT
AZE BHS
BHR
BGD BRBBLR
BEL
LZBENBMUBIH
BWA
B A
BRNBGR
FBDIKHM CDN
CPV
C I
HKG
MAC
CHNCOLCRCCRO
CYP
CZECIV
DEN
DJI
DOMEGY
ESA
EST
ETHFIJ FINFRA
GAB
GEO
GER
UA
GUI
GBSHAI HON
HUN
ISL
INDIN
IRL
ISRITAJAM JPNJO
KAZ
KOR
KOSKUWK ZLAO
LAT
LIB
LES
L A
LTU
LUX
AD M S
MDV
MLI
MLT
MRIMEXMDMGLARM Z
NAM
NCANIG
NGR NOROMAP K
PAN
PNG
P R PERP I POLPORROU
R SWA SAKSAS NSRB
SEY
SIN
SVKSLO
RSA
ESP
ISUDSWZ SWE
SUI
SYTJK
THA
TOG TTUGKR UK
USA
URU
VV NYEZA
−
2
0
−
1
0
0
1
0
N
e
t 
B
a
n
k
 F
lo
w
s
 (
%
 o
f 
G
D
P
)
1 2 3 4 5
Government Effectiveness
Government Effectiveness
ALB
AGO
ARGARM ABWAUS
AUT
AZE BHS
BHR
BGD BRBBLR
BEL
BLZBENBMUBIH
BWA
BRA
BRN BGR
FBDIKHM CDN
CPV
CHI
HK
MAC
CHN COL CRCCRO
CYP
CZECIV
DEN
DJI
DOMEGY
ESA
EST
ETH IJ FINFRA
GAB
GEO
GER
GUA
GUI
BSHAI HON
HUN
ISL
INDINA
IRL
ISRITAJAMJPNJOR
KAZ
KOR
KOSKUWKGZLAO
LAT
LIB
LES
LBA
LTU
LUX
MADM S
MDV
MLI
MLT
MRIEXMGLA MOZ
NAM
NCANI
NGR NOROMAPAK
PAN
PNG
PARPERPHI POLPORROU
RUSRWA SAKSA SENRB
SEY
SIN
SVKSLO
RS
ESP
S ISUDS Z SWE
SUI
SYRTJK
THA
TOG TRIT RUG UKR UK
USA
URU
V NVENYEM Z
−
2
0
−
1
0
0
1
0
0 1 2 3 4
Voice & Accountability
Voice & Accountability
ALB
AGO
ARGARM ABW AUS
AUT
AZE BHS
BHR
BGD RBBLR
BEL
B ZBENBMUBIH
BWA
RA
BRNBGR
BFBDI KHM CDN
CPV
CHI
HKG
MAC
CHNCOLCRCCRO
CYP
CZECIV
DEN
DJI
DOMEGY
ESA
EST
ETH FIJ FIFRA
GAB
GEO
GER
GUA
GUI
GBSHAI HO
HUN
ISL
NDIN
IRL
ISRITAJAM JPNJOR
KAZ
KOR
KOSKUWZLAO
LAT
LIB
LES
LBA
LTU
LUX
M D AS
MDV
LI
MLT
MRIMEXMDGLM Z
NA
NCAN G
NGR NORMAPAK
PAN
PNG
R PEPHI POLPORROU
USRWA SAMKSSES
SEY
SIN
SVKO
RS
ESP
RISUD WZ SWE
SUI
SYRTJK
THA
TO TRITUUGAUKR K
USA
URU
V NVEYE M
−
2
0
−
1
0
0
1
0
0 1 2 3 4
Regulatory Quality
Regulatory Quality
Note: Values are averages between 1998−2009
Note 1: Quadratic fit using ordinary least squares.
Note 2: Bank outflows and institutional indices are averages for 1998-2009 (average of
n=65 countries).
Source: World Bank Governance Indicators, and International Monetary Fund’s Interna-
tional Financial Statistics
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Figure 2: Gross FDI & Bank Flows
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(average of n=65 countries).
Source: International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics
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Figure 3: Institutional Quality by Income
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countries (1998-2009, n = 168).
Source: Kaufmann et. al. (2010)
99
Figure 4: Monitoring Cost & Rule of Law
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Figure 5: Interest Rate Spread & Rule of Law
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Figure 6: Economy’s Time-line
t=0 t=1
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allocates the
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monitoring
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...
Note: Sequence of events in the model. Household agents live for two periods while
projects last one period.
Figure 7: The Return Spectrum of the Safe Projects
x E[πe] x¯Risky Projects Safe Projects
Note 1: x and x¯ are lower and upper limits of return for safe projects. x < E[pie] is the
expected profit of the risky project.
Note 2: Each entrepreneur with x < E[pie] will choose to operate a risky project instead
of the safe project, and each entrepreneur with x > E[pie] will operate the safe project.
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Figure 8: Labour Input for Monitoring, lf,t
(a) Endogenous model with σ = 0.3
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Figure 9: Ratio of Risky Projects to Total Projects, φt
(a) Endogenous model with σ = 0.3
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(b) Endogenous model with σ = 0.7
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Figure 10: The Rate of Bankruptcy of the Risky Projects, θˆt
(a) Endogenous model with σ = 0.3
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(b) Endogenous model with σ = 0.7
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(c) Exogenous model
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Figure 11: Lending Interest Rate, ret
(a) Endogenous model with σ = 0.3
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Note 2: Higher vales of µ indicate better technology
(b) Endogenous model with σ = 0.7
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Figure 12: Interest Rate Spread & Monitoring Cost
(a) Endogenous model with σ = 0.3
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(b) Endogenous model with σ = 0.7
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(c) Exogenous model
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Note: Interest Rate Spread = ret − dt, and
Monitoring Cost = φt[θˆtMtbt + wtlf,t].
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Figure 13: Net Capital Outflow, dt − φtbt
(a) Endogenous model with σ = 0.3
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(b) Endogenous model with σ = 0.7
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Figure 14: Net Capital Outflow as a Percentage of Output
(a) Endogenous model with σ = 0.3
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(b) Endogenous model with σ = 0.7
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(c) Exogenous model
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Yt
where Yt is the sum of both
risky and safe project outputs.
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Figure 15: Loan size, bt
(a) Endogenous model with σ = 0.3
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(b) Endogenous model with σ = 0.7
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(c) Exogenous model
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Figure 16: Total Output, Yt
(a) Endogenous model with σ = 0.3
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(b) Endogenous model with σ = 0.7
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(c) Exogenous model
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Figure 17: Net/Gross Bank & FDI Flows (% of GDP)
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Source: International Financial Statistics (IMF) Database
Note: Average (per year) gross/net flow of bank loans and gross/net FDI as percentage
of output (n = 65).
Source: International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics.
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Figure 18: Net/Gross Bank & FDI Flows (% of GDP) by Income Group
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Note 1: LI = Low Income, LMI = Lower Mid-Income, UMI = Upper Mid-Income, HI =
High Income (non-OECD), HI-OECD = High Income OECD
Note 2: Average (per year) gross/net flow of bank loans and gross/net FDI as percentage
of output (n = 65).
Source: International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics.
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Figure 19: Net/Gross Bank & FDI Flows (% of GDP) by Region
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Note 1: ECA = East Central Asia, ME/NA = Middle East/North Africa, E = Europe,
NA =North America, CA = Central America, SA = South America, SSA = SubSaharan
Africa, OC = Oceania
Note 2: Gross/net bank loan flows, average per region (n = 65).
Source: International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics
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Figure 20: Institutional Quality by Income Group
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Figure 21: Institutional Quality by Region
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Figure 22: Marginal Effects: Political Stability
(a) political stability (All Countries)
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Figure 23: Marginal Effects: Rule of Law
(a) rule of law (Mid-income Countries)
(b) rule of law (Rich Countries)
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Figure 24: Marginal Effects: Voice & Accountability
(a) voice & accountability (Mid-income Countries)
(b) voice & accountability (Rich Countries)
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Figure 25: Marginal Effects: Others
(a) Quality of Governance (Mid-income Countries)
(b) Control of Corruption (Rich Countries)
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2 Appendix B - Tables
Table 1: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Description
ak 0.3 Risky project’s output elasticity of capital
al 0.65 Risky project’s output elasticity of labour
At 1 Risky project’s total factor productivity
x 1.05 Lower bound for safe projects’ return
x¯ 1.15 Upper bound for safe projects’ return
ξ 0.96 1
ξ
is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
ρ 0.96 Subjective discount rate
η 0.3 Weight of labour in utility
rdt 0.02 Risk-free deposit interest rate
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Table 2: Exogenous Model: Changes in quality of institutions (varying z)
z Lt bt dt kt lt φt πt θt wt r
e
t
2.0 0.8690527 0.0091 0.18794 0.3718 1.443 60.23% 1.092276 0.4275% 0.44172 3.0752%
2.5 0.8690518 0.0074 0.18790 0.3711 1.441 60.32% 1.092388 0.3459% 0.44163 3.0431%
3.0 0.8690512 0.0062 0.18788 0.3707 1.439 60.39% 1.092464 0.2905% 0.44157 3.0212%
3.5 0.8690507 0.0053 0.18786 0.3704 1.438 60.43% 1.092518 0.2504% 0.44153 3.0054%
4.0 0.8690504 0.0047 0.18784 0.3701 1.437 60.47% 1.09256 0.2200% 0.44150 2.9935%
φtbt
dt
φtbt
dt − φtbt θtMtbt safe Yt risky Yt total Yt
dt−φtbt
Yt
θtMtbt
bt
φtbt
Yt
0.0055 34.14947 0.18243 4.7E-05 0.05327 0.94545 0.9987 18.2667% 0.855% 0.55%
0.0045 42.17520 0.18345 3.85E-05 0.05314 0.94542 0.9986 18.3708% 0.865% 0.45%
0.0037 50.20104 0.18413 3.26E-05 0.05306 0.94540 0.9985 18.4416% 0.872% 0.37%
0.0032 58.22696 0.18463 2.83E-05 0.05300 0.94539 0.9984 18.4929% 0.876% 0.32%
0.0028 66.25292 0.18501 2.5E-05 0.05296 0.94538 0.9983 18.5317% 0.880% 0.28%
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Table 3: Endogenous model with σ = 0.3
z µ Lt Mt bt dt lf,t kt le,t φt πt wt θt
2.0 12 0.869071 0.25 0.05 0.18867 0.002 0.389 1.50 57.8% 1.089 0.4434 2.5%
2.0 14 0.869065 0.41 0.04 0.18844 0.001 0.382 1.48 58.7% 1.090 0.4429 1.8%
2.0 16 0.869060 0.71 0.02 0.18821 0.000 0.377 1.46 59.5% 1.091 0.4424 1.1%
2.5 12 0.869074 0.16 0.08 0.18880 0.004 0.397 1.53 56.5% 1.088 0.4437 3.5%
2.5 14 0.869070 0.24 0.06 0.18864 0.002 0.389 1.51 57.6% 1.089 0.4434 2.6%
2.5 16 0.869066 0.35 0.04 0.18849 0.001 0.384 1.49 58.4% 1.090 0.4430 2.0%
3.0 12 0.869073 0.12 0.10 0.18873 0.009 0.405 1.56 55.3% 1.086 0.4436 4.5%
3.0 14 0.869072 0.17 0.07 0.18870 0.005 0.396 1.53 56.6% 1.088 0.4435 3.4%
3.0 16 0.869069 0.24 0.06 0.18860 0.003 0.390 1.51 57.6% 1.089 0.4433 2.7%
3.5 12 0.869065 0.10 0.12 0.18844 0.015 0.412 1.60 54.0% 1.085 0.4429 5.5%
3.5 14 0.869069 0.14 0.09 0.18860 0.009 0.402 1.55 55.6% 1.087 0.4433 4.2%
3.5 16 0.869069 0.19 0.07 0.18860 0.005 0.395 1.53 56.7% 1.088 0.4433 3.3%
4.0 12 0.869051 0.09 0.14 0.18788 0.024 0.420 1.63 52.6% 1.083 0.4416 6.4%
4.0 14 0.869063 0.12 0.11 0.18834 0.014 0.408 1.58 54.5% 1.085 0.4427 4.9%
4.0 16 0.869067 0.15 0.08 0.18850 0.009 0.400 1.55 55.9% 1.087 0.4430 3.9%
z µ ret φtbt
dt
φtbt
dt − φtbt φt(θtMtbt + wtlf,t) safe Yt risky Yt total Yt
dt−φtbt
Yt
θtMtbt+wtlf,t
bt
φtlf,t
2.0 12 5.27% 0.032 6.0 0.157 0.0006 0.056 0.944 1.00063 15.7% 2.0% 0.0009
2.0 14 4.46% 0.022 8.5 0.166 0.0003 0.055 0.945 1.00031 16.6% 1.5% 0.0004
2.0 16 3.77% 0.014 13.4 0.174 0.0002 0.054 0.945 0.99968 17.4% 1.2% 0.0001
2.5 12 6.92% 0.044 4.3 0.145 0.0013 0.058 0.941 0.99939 14.5% 3.0% 0.0024
2.5 14 5.80% 0.033 5.7 0.156 0.0008 0.057 0.943 1.00007 15.6% 2.4% 0.0013
2.5 16 5.02% 0.025 7.5 0.163 0.0005 0.056 0.944 1.00012 16.3% 2.0% 0.0007
3.0 12 8.86% 0.054 3.5 0.134 0.0024 0.060 0.937 0.99629 13.5% 4.4% 0.0048
3.0 14 7.31% 0.042 4.5 0.147 0.0015 0.058 0.941 0.99857 14.7% 3.5% 0.0027
3.0 16 6.25% 0.033 5.7 0.156 0.0009 0.057 0.943 0.99947 15.6% 2.8% 0.0016
3.5 12 11.13% 0.064 2.9 0.124 0.0039 0.061 0.930 0.99105 12.5% 6.1% 0.0081
3.5 14 9.06% 0.050 3.7 0.138 0.0024 0.059 0.936 0.99569 13.9% 4.8% 0.0048
3.5 16 7.66% 0.040 4.7 0.148 0.0016 0.058 0.940 0.99787 14.9% 3.9% 0.0030
4.0 12 13.76% 0.073 2.6 0.115 0.0059 0.063 0.920 0.98343 11.7% 8.1% 0.0125
4.0 14 11.09% 0.058 3.2 0.130 0.0037 0.061 0.931 0.99124 13.1% 6.3% 0.0076
4.0 16 9.27% 0.047 4.0 0.141 0.0024 0.059 0.936 0.99519 14.2% 5.1% 0.0048
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Table 4: Endogenous model with σ = 0.7
z µ Lt Mt bt dt lf,t kt le,t φt πt wt θt
2.0 12 0.86897 0.102 0.23 0.184 0.07 0.452 1.79 47% 1.076 0.434 10.4%
2.0 14 0.86899 0.097 0.20 0.185 0.06 0.443 1.74 48% 1.078 0.436 9.3%
2.0 16 0.86901 0.096 0.18 0.186 0.05 0.436 1.71 49% 1.079 0.438 8.5%
2.5 12 0.86891 0.138 0.23 0.182 0.10 0.454 1.82 45% 1.074 0.428 11.0%
2.5 14 0.86894 0.129 0.21 0.184 0.08 0.445 1.77 47% 1.076 0.432 9.9%
2.5 16 0.86897 0.124 0.19 0.185 0.07 0.438 1.73 48% 1.078 0.434 9.0%
3.0 12 0.86884 0.177 0.23 0.180 0.13 0.455 1.85 44% 1.073 0.422 11.5%
3.0 14 0.86889 0.164 0.21 0.182 0.10 0.446 1.79 46% 1.075 0.427 10.4%
3.0 16 0.86892 0.155 0.19 0.183 0.08 0.440 1.75 47% 1.077 0.430 9.5%
3.5 12 0.86877 0.217 0.24 0.177 0.16 0.456 1.87 43% 1.071 0.417 12.0%
3.5 14 0.86883 0.199 0.21 0.179 0.13 0.447 1.82 45% 1.074 0.422 10.8%
3.5 16 0.86888 0.187 0.20 0.181 0.11 0.441 1.77 46% 1.075 0.426 9.9%
4.0 12 0.86870 0.258 0.24 0.175 0.19 0.456 1.90 42% 1.070 0.410 12.5%
4.0 14 0.86878 0.236 0.22 0.177 0.15 0.448 1.84 44% 1.072 0.417 11.2%
4.0 16 0.86883 0.220 0.20 0.179 0.13 0.441 1.80 45% 1.074 0.421 10.3%
z µ ret φtbt
dt
φtbt
dt − φtbt φt(θtMtbt + wtlf,t) safe Yt risky Yt total Yt
dt−φtbt
Yt
θtMtbt+wtlf,t
bt
φtlf,t
2.0 12 23% 0.106 1.7 0.079 0.016 0.071 0.87 0.94 8.4% 15% 0.034
2.0 14 21% 0.098 1.9 0.088 0.013 0.069 0.89 0.96 9.2% 13% 0.028
2.0 16 19% 0.091 2.0 0.095 0.011 0.067 0.90 0.96 9.9% 12% 0.024
2.5 12 29% 0.105 1.7 0.077 0.021 0.073 0.85 0.92 8.4% 20% 0.045
2.5 14 26% 0.098 1.9 0.086 0.017 0.070 0.87 0.94 9.1% 18% 0.037
2.5 16 24% 0.092 2.0 0.093 0.015 0.069 0.88 0.95 9.8% 16% 0.032
3.0 12 35% 0.103 1.7 0.076 0.026 0.074 0.83 0.90 8.5% 25% 0.056
3.0 14 31% 0.097 1.9 0.084 0.022 0.072 0.84 0.92 9.2% 22% 0.047
3.0 16 28% 0.091 2.0 0.091 0.019 0.070 0.86 0.93 9.8% 20% 0.040
3.5 12 41% 0.101 1.8 0.076 0.031 0.076 0.80 0.88 8.7% 30% 0.067
3.5 14 37% 0.096 1.9 0.084 0.026 0.073 0.82 0.90 9.3% 27% 0.057
3.5 16 33% 0.091 2.0 0.090 0.022 0.072 0.84 0.91 9.9% 25% 0.049
4.0 12 47% 0.099 1.8 0.076 0.035 0.078 0.78 0.85 8.9% 36% 0.079
4.0 14 42% 0.094 1.9 0.083 0.030 0.075 0.80 0.88 9.5% 32% 0.067
4.0 16 38% 0.089 2.0 0.090 0.026 0.073 0.82 0.90 10.0% 29% 0.058
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Variable Sample Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Net Bank Flows (%)
overall 0.3707 7.3421 -84.3697 71.8332 N = 1265
between 3.6197 -26.5325 17.4553 n = 135
within 6.5067 -72.4888 75.8153 T-bar = 9.4
Net FDI Flows (%)
overall 2.6128 7.9720 -128.6324 80.3949 N = 1132
between 5.5370 -39.4774 27.3914 n = 123
within 5.8557 -86.5422 75.4589 T = 9.2
Control of Corruption
overall 2.5115 0.9974 0.6882 5.0908 N = 1851
between 0.9814 1.0718 4.9757 n = 171
within 0.1915 1.8769 3.4022 T = 10.8
Government Effectiveness
overall 2.5413 0.9639 0.2288 4.8740 N = 1848
between 0.9500 0.7746 4.6371 n = 171
within 0.1701 1.4500 3.3042 T = 10.8
Political Stability
overall 2.4532 0.9529 0.0017 4.1628 N = 1828
between 0.9160 0.3332 4.0376 n = 170
within 0.2921 1.2301 3.7911 T = 10.7
Regulatory Quality
overall 2.5675 0.9231 0.1550 4.6504 N = 1846
between 0.9033 0.4025 4.4243 n = 171
within 0.1856 1.7652 3.4744 T = 10.7
Rule of Law
overall 2.4858 0.9674 0.4142 4.5142 N = 1851
between 0.9555 0.8704 4.4482 n = 171
within 0.1689 1.6657 3.3249 T = 10.8
Voice & Accountability
overall 2.5154 0.9398 0.2820 4.3255 N = 1852
between 0.9211 0.4084 4.1082 n = 171
within 0.1842 1.4670 3.2908 T = 10.8
Stocks Traded (% of GDP)
overall 33.4936 62.8788 0.0000 755.0607 N = 1130
between 52.7856 0.0148 244.0213 n = 109
within 32.8885 -92.5343 548.1824 T = 10.3
Treasury Bill Rate (%)
overall 9.1278 8.8827 -0.0800 93.2400 N = 946
between 7.3816 1.3755 37.3750 n = 95
within 5.5068 -20.2460 64.9928 T = 9.9
Exchange Rate per USD
overall 542.4667 1,878.0900 0.2300 16,302.2500 N = 1878
between 1,834.9930 0.2945 15,172.7000 n = 171
within 415.8589 -5,033.3690 5,201.3690 T = 10.9
Openness (M+X/GDP), %
overall 90.5623 50.9312 0.3088 444.1000 N = 1810
between 49.3043 0.8398 387.7838 n = 168
within 13.0080 11.5082 170.8922 T = 10.7
Table 5: Summary Statistics
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Quadratic Model - Hausman Test
Mid-income Rich All
χ2 16.0718 0.1112 15.4532
d.f. 16 16 16
p-value 0.4480 0.9980 0.4917
NOTE: Hausman (1978) specification test
Table 6: Specification Test
Quadratic Model - Breusch Pagan Test
Mid-income Rich All
χ2 348.201 3.650 17.920
d.f. 1 1 1
p-value 0.0000 0.0561 0.0000
NOTE: Breusch-Pagan LM Test (1980)
Table 7: Random Effects Test
Quadratic Model - Serial Correlation Test
Mid-income Rich All
χ2 1.659 18.369 7.893
d.f. 1 1 1
p-value 0.1977 0.0011 0.0050
NOTE: Breusch (1978) Godfrey (1978) LM Test
Table 8: Residual Autocorrelation Test
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Dep = Net Bank Flows (% of GDP)
All Countries Rich Mid-Income
regulatory quality 2.273 −1.7941 8.4398∗∗∗
government effectiveness 1.7551 −4.4423 −2.1401
rule of law 2.8524 16.2828∗∗∗ 6.8067∗∗∗
voice & accountability −0.8300 −5.0850∗∗ 4.0481∗∗∗
political stability 0.7586 1.7304 −2.6231∗∗∗
control of corruption −6.0163∗∗∗ −13.8278∗∗∗ −10.5547∗∗∗
Lagged Differenced Exchange rate (per US$) −0.3131∗∗ −0.9061∗∗∗ −0.0986
Lagged Treasury Bill Rate (%) −0.9767∗∗∗ 0.7976 −1.4754∗∗∗
Lagged Openness (abs(X+M)/GDP, %) 1.3314∗∗ 2.7653∗∗∗ −0.3539
Lagged Stocks traded total value (% of GDP) −0.2411∗ 0.4165∗ −0.5029∗∗∗
Constant −2.1312 −7.6621 0.7641
Total Number of Obs. 457 224 233
Number of Countries 56 26 30
Overall R2 0.0249 0.1150 0.1410
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 9: FGLS Random Effects (Level-Log): 1998-2008
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Dep = Net Bank Flows (% of GDP)
All Countries Rich Mid-Income
regulatory quality :
-Level 10.5030 −28.9970 −3.9263
-Squared −4.7290 11.0040 6.2504
government effectiveness :
-Level: 7.3720 59.8850 10.8650
-Squared: −2.7700 −23.1030 −8.5435∗
rule of law :
-Level: −2.6520 136.8010∗∗∗ −8.5214
-Squared: 2.8860 −56.8000∗∗∗ 6.7150∗
voice & accountability :
-Level: −1.1870 −39.8600∗∗∗ −7.5247∗∗
-Squared: −0.4580 18.1810∗∗∗ 6.9551∗∗∗
political stability :
-Level: −0.1520 −1.7110 −1.0022∗∗
-Squared: 2.1080∗∗∗ 2.8880 0.1650
control of corruption:
-Level: 1.4400 −51.2450∗ 1.4037
-Squared: −3.3670 20.5840∗ −4.7924
Lagged Differenced Log Exchange rate (per US$) −0.5029 −1.0016∗∗∗ −0.0160
Lagged Log Treasury Bill Rate (%) −1.0630∗∗∗ −0.6490 −1.0923∗∗∗
Lagged Log Openness 1.2610∗∗∗ 1.9530∗∗ 0.8361
(abs(X+M)/GDP, %)
Lagged Log Stocks traded −0.3180∗∗ −0.5180∗∗ −0.1368
total value (% of GDP)
Constant −8.9630∗ −53.9520 1.0978
Total Number of Obs. 457 224 233
Number of Countries 56 26 30
Overall R2 0.0404 0.1574 0.1565
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 10: FGLS Quadratic Random Effects (Level-Log): 1998-2008
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Mid-income Rich All
Regulatory Quality - - -
Government Effectiveness -0.864 - -
Rule of Law 0.804 -2.890 -
Voice & Accountability 0.717 1.323 -
Political Stability - - -0.008
Control of Corruption - 1.409 -
Table 11: Percentage point change in net flows
given a 1 std. dev. increase from mean
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Dep = Bank Inflows (% of GDP)
All Countries Rich Mid-Income
regulatory quality :
-Level −2.7160 28.8310∗ −45.9168
-Squared 14.3126∗∗∗ −19.6582∗ 15.7296
government effectiveness :
-Level −39.1140∗∗∗ −28.1044∗ −8.0546
-Squared 18.1259∗∗∗ 21.1164∗∗∗ −5.0195
rule of law :
-Level 27.2588∗∗∗ 3.7760 52.7912∗
-Squared −27.7450∗∗∗ −3.2914 −68.7042∗∗∗
voice & accountability :
-Level −39.5149∗∗∗ −10.3739 31.7148∗∗
-Squared −1.9174 8.8044∗ 5.9648
political stability :
-Level −1.4070∗ 3.0425 6.5698∗∗∗
-Squared −0.9854 −1.4136 4.6777∗∗∗
control of corruption:
-Level 57.7105∗∗∗ −2.5932 −64.9982∗∗∗
-Squared −25.3452∗∗∗ −2.7138 57.979∗∗∗
Lagged Differenced Log 0.0869 0.0284 −1.0393∗∗
Exchange rate (per US$)
Lagged Log Treasury Bill Rate (%) 1.5997∗∗∗ 1.8562∗∗∗ −3.6091∗∗∗
Lagged Log Openness −12.2127∗∗∗ −1.0326 −9.1719∗∗∗
(abs(X+M)/GDP, %)
Lagged Log Stocks Traded −0.1616∗ 0.1095 0.6480
total value (% of GDP)
Constant 57.5594∗∗∗ 1.2635 60.3831∗∗∗
Total Number of Obs 458 236 222
Number of Countries 56 26 30
Overall R2 0.0618 0.0746 0.0771
∗p < 0.1,∗∗p < 0.05,∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 12: FGLS - Inflow Regression (Level-Log): 1998-2008
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Dep = Bank Outflows (% of GDP)
All Countries Rich Mid-Income
regulatory quality :
-Level −1.6179 12.0556 −16.4334
-Squared 0.8531 −33.6537∗∗∗ 11.1893
government effectiveness :
-Level 3.0275 −55.3683∗∗∗ 44.7999∗∗∗
-Squared −4.3208 43.6348∗∗∗ −34.1337∗∗∗
rule of law :
-Level 10.1492 42.1717∗∗∗ 13.1196
-Squared −12.6942∗ −34.1244∗∗∗ −22.1335∗∗
voice & accountability :
-Level 4.0867 16.4131∗ 36.5301∗∗∗
-Squared −0.4520 2.6293 −21.6229∗∗∗
political stability :
-Level −1.6055 −11.7341∗∗∗ 6.8871∗∗
-Squared 4.9720∗∗ 12.9768∗∗∗ −4.3436∗
control of corruption:
-Level −5.1843 45.2377∗∗∗ −29.3698
-Squared 3.6277 −30.9482∗∗∗ 36.8631∗∗∗
Lagged Differenced Log −0.1744 −0.3973 −2.4516∗∗∗
Exchange rate (per US$)
Lagged Log Treasury Bill Rate (%) −1.1242∗∗ −12.8861∗∗∗ 0.2056
Lagged Log Openness −3.2138∗∗ −1.7267∗∗∗ −0.5175
(abs(X+M)/GDP, %)
Lagged Log Stocks Traded 0.4093∗ −0.0466 −0.2115
total value (% of GDP)
Constant 14.1471∗ 30.3538∗∗∗ −17.4925∗
Total Number of Obs 482 239 243
Number of Countries 59 26 33
Overall R2 0.0181 0.0619 0.0155
∗p < 0.1,∗∗p < 0.05,∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 13: FGLS - Outflow Regression (Level-Log): 1998-2008
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List of Countries
Mid-income Rich
Armenia Australia
Bolivia Austria
Brazil Barbados
Egypt Belgium
Georgia Canada
Indonesia China: Hong Kong
Jamaica Cyprus
Kazakhstan Czech Republic
Latvia Denmark
Lebanon France
Lithuania Germany
Malta Hungary
Malaysia Iceland
Mexico Israel
Moldova Italy
Mongolia Japan
Nigeria Kuwait
Pakistan Poland
Papua New Guinea Singapore
Philippines Slovenia
Romania Spain
Russia Sweden
Serbia Republic of Switzerland
South Africa Trinidad and Tobago
Sri Lanka United Kingdom
Swaziland United States
Thailand
Turkey
Uruguay
Zambia
Table 14: List of 56 Countries In The Sample
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